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Abstract
When should we accommodate religious practices? When
should we demand that religious groups instead conform to social
or legal norms? Who should make these decisions, and how? These
questions lie at the very heart of our contemporary debates in the
field of Law and Religion.
Particularly thorny issues arise where religious practices may
impose health-related harm to children within a religious group
or to third parties. Unfortunately, legislators, courts, scholars,
ethicists, and medical practitioners have not offered a consistent
way to analyze such cases, so the law is inconsistent. This Article
suggests, first, that the lack of consistency is a troubling artifact of
our political system, and, second, that it raises serious
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constitutional questions that lie at the intersection of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
To resolve these problems, we offer and develop a test to
determine whether such a religious practice should be
accommodated by legislators, courts, and medical practitioners.
Our test is sensitive to the institutional strengths and weaknesses
of differently situated decision makers and is designed to be
flexible enough to account for these differences. Consequently, it
has distinctive applications for legislators, administrative
officials, judges, and medical practitioners. Further, although the
test was developed specifically to address religious practices that
may impose health-related harms to children and third-parties, it
also has potential implications in other contexts as well, such as
the debate over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination
laws should accommodate religious dissent.
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I. Introduction
To accommodate or not to accommodate religious beliefs—
that is the question that dominates the field of Law and Religion
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today. 1 It is a question that confronts all modern liberal societies,
and the space for accommodating religious objections to general
legal obligations is increasingly contested in contemporary
American legal, political, and ethical discourse.
This problem is especially acute where the majority culture
perceives a religious practice or requirement to impose risks,
harms, burdens, or costs on children. 2 A parent’s refusal to
supply medical treatment to a child may lead to the death of the
child. 3 Parents who refuse to vaccinate a child due to the
demands of their religion or conscience can put their child at
grave risk, as well as other children across society who cannot be
vaccinated. 4 Opponents of ritual male infant circumcision
controversially assert that it causes intolerable pain, inhibits
future sexual pleasure, and violates autonomy. 5 Many more
1. See, e.g., Hillel Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power,
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1617, 1619 (2015) [hereinafter Levin, Rethinking
Religious Minorities] (noting several recent court cases involving religious
accommodation).
2. See, e.g., Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory
Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV.
73, 76 (2011) (explaining that exemptions from vaccination can result in an
epidemic); Lesley Stone, Lance Gable & Tara Gingerich, When the Right to
Health and the Right to Religion Conflict: A Human Rights Analysis, 12 MICH.
ST. J. INT’L. L. 247, 305 (2004) (explaining that religious exemptions reduce
immunization rates, making it more difficult to protect public health); Eliana
Dockterman, Faith-Healing Parents Jailed After Second Child’s Death, TIME
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://time.com/8750/faith-healing-parents-jailed-after-secondchilds-death/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2015) (reporting that parents were sent to jail
after their second child died as a result of their refusal to take him to the doctor)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Dockterman, supra note 2 (describing the case of the Schaible
family, whose two young sons died from pneumonia when their parents refused
to provide medical care).
4. See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 79 (“Vaccination of an individual benefits
not just the vaccinated person but all susceptible persons in the community.”);
Stone, Gable & Gingerich, supra note 2, at 305 (“Religious exemptions from
immunization requirements reduce these immunization rates and may make it
difficult to achieve the necessary levels of immunity to protect public health. An
under-immunized population is more susceptible to an infectious disease
outbreak. Indeed, the risk of an outbreak increases as immunization rates
decrease.”).
5. See Martha Groves, Male Circumcision Opponents Propose Ballot
Measure in Santa Monica, L.A. TIMES (May 25, 2011), http://articles.
latimes.com/2011/may/25/local/la-me-circumcision-ban-20110525 (last visited
Dec. 30, 2015) (stating that opponents to male circumcision believe it is a
painful and unnecessary procedure, and that the children should be protected)
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attack female genital alteration 6 on similar grounds. 7 Some
oppose the practice of homeschooling children, ostensibly out of
concern that school attendance provides necessary socializing and
educational experiences. 8 Should society give religious groups
and individuals special exemptions in such circumstances?
Unfortunately, there is little consistency in either the politics
or the law surrounding such questions. Neither courts nor
scholars have offered systematic approaches for resolving these
questions in a manner that dignifies the competing underlying
values in the debate—religious minorities’ right to practice
according to their beliefs versus society’s interest in protecting
the vulnerable and in enforcing its rules evenhandedly.
Moreover, these conflicts also have important constitutional
dimensions. On the one hand, religious believers may look to the
Free Exercise Clause 9 (as well as related federal and state
statutes and state constitutional provisions), the constitutional
right to raise one’s children as one sees fit, and constitutional
principles of non-discrimination for support for their religious
liberty claims. 10 On the other hand, there are serious
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See generally I. Utz-Billing & H. Kentenich, Female Genital Mutilation:
An Injury, Physical and Mental Harm, 29 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 225 (2008) (providing an overview of female genital alteration).
7. See generally Kavita Shah Arora & Allan J. Jacobs, Female Genital
Alteration: A Compromise Solution, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 148 (2016) (reviewing the
ethics and policy surrounding female genital alteration); Edith M. Lederer,
United Nations Calls for Global Ban on Female Genital Mutilation, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/un-committeecalls-for-ba_0_n _2198244.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2015) (stating that the
opponents of female genital mutilation describe it as “harmful and a serious
threat to the psychological, sexual, and reproductive health of women and girls”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see generally Arora &
Jacobs, supra note 7 (describing forms of female genital alteration with little
effect on the recipient).
8. See Judith G. McMullen, Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate
Homeschooling?, 54 S.C. L. REV. 75, 83 (2002) (describing the argument that
homeschooling deprives children of social interaction and inhibits development
of teamwork and collaboration skills).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
10. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (concluding that
Nebraska’s state statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to
someone who had not yet passed the eighth grade infringed upon a person’s
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
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Establishment Clause concerns with accommodating religious
believers in a manner that harms others. 11
This Article aims to correct this deficiency by offering a test
to balance our society’s commitment to pluralism and liberty
against our interest in protecting children and third parties in a
principled and consistent manner. Although the test was
developed in the healthcare and childcare contexts, it also has
potential implications for other kinds of conflicts between religion
and state as well. 12 It provides, for example, a possible approach
to
the
politically
polarizing
question
of
whether
antidiscrimination laws that protect people on the basis of sexual
orientation should include religious exemptions. 13
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly reviews the
constitutional and statutory law of religious accommodation and
the related academic debates. 14 It also shows that American law
is inconsistent in the way in which it balances the values
implicated in the debate over accommodation versus
non-accommodation. Part III considers some troubling aspects of
this inconsistency. 15 This Part also applies insights of public
choice theory to assess why lawmakers sometimes over-embrace
religious accommodation by permitting minority religious
practices to persist even when they harm third parties, but
sometimes under-embrace it by prohibiting minority religious
practices that impose few costs on society. This Part concludes by
calling for a principled approach to these questions.

268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (concluding that Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act
unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of their children); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
101–02 (2000) (concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make child-rearing decisions).
11. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682–83
(describing the complex issues associated with balancing religious liberty and
the general public interest).
12. See infra Part IV (establishing a balancing test that considers certain
religious practices and resulting health and safety concerns).
13. Infra Part IV.
14. Infra Part II.
15. Infra Part III.
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Part IV proceeds to articulate and develop a test for resolving
these conflicts. 16 It shows how the test may be used by differently
situated decision-makers in a manner that plays to their
institutional strengths. It explores how the test appropriately
mediates between the competing philosophical values at stake
and aids in sorting out the complex interplay between different
constitutional norms. This Part concludes by illustrating
application of the test in a variety of contexts. Part V considers
several implications and limitations of, as well as possible
objections to, the test. The Article concludes by highlighting
several benefits of the test.
II. To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate?
Every society must choose whether and how to accommodate,
celebrate, or undermine religious sub-communities’ distinctive
identities and practices within the larger polity. 17 In this Part, we
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Two related issues that we will not address are (1) what constitutes
religion and (2) which religions deserve government recognition. Religion may
be regarded alternatively as theistic belief systems, in which a Divine presence
with a will governs or influences the world. See, e.g., Genesis 1:3 (“And God said,
Let there be light: and there was light.”); John 3:16 (“For God so loved the
world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him
should not perish, but have everlasting life.”). Other belief systems involve
transcendental or numinous concepts, see, e.g., CHARLES TALIAFERRO, A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 640–41 (2d ed., 2010) (discussing the
reincarnation and karma belief systems), or any entity or belief that “speak[s] of
the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of
what you take seriously without any reservation.” United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS
57 (1948)). We do not choose among these and other alternative definitions.
As for the question of which religions deserve government recognition, the
Establishment Clause forbids the government from officially recognizing or
privileging any religion or religious group over others. See U.S. CONST. amend. I
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). Further, as we will discuss, a single
religion may have different groups, sects, or denominations within it, all of
which are owed equal treatment by the government. Id. Cases have suggested
that even idiosyncratic religious beliefs, if sincerely held, are entitled to the
same respect as established religions. See Ben-Levi v. Brown, 136 S. Ct. 930,
932 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stressing that the lower courts improperly
found that Ben-Levi’s religious exercise was not burdened because he
“misunderstands his own religion”); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015)
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(noting that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act protects
‘‘‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or central to a system of
religious belief’” (citation omitted)); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723–24
(2005) (upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) where inmates from non-mainstream religions challenged the
prison’s refusal to accommodate their religious needs). Some cases and scholars
have gone so far as to suggest that non-transcendental beliefs of conscience are
also to be treated as “religious” for statutory or constitutional purposes. See
generally Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187; Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of
Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 917–18 (2010). For a brief review of the
literature about the relationship between freedom of conscience claims and
freedom of religion claims, see Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience
and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1459–61 (2013). Chapman’s Article goes
on to thoughtfully address this relationship in greater detail. Id.
On the other hand, some contemporary Western states recognize official
religions and thus have a relatively narrow definition of which religions deserve
government recognition. Other states, such as those in the former Soviet bloc,
place open religious expression that does not take place under the aegis of
government-sanctioned religious groups at serious legal disadvantage (e.g.,
Russia, Hungary). See International Religious Freedom Report for 2014, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.
htm#wrapper (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (noting the difficulties faced by
non-government sanctioned religious groups) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). More liberal states have, at times, discriminated against
religious bodies that do not fully accept government legitimacy (e.g., Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Scientology). See generally Keturah A. Dunner, Comment,
Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of Article 9
of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30
CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 117 (1999) (noting discriminatory actions taken by the
government against perceived “dangerous” religious groups). Our focus in this
Article, however, is on American law, which does not assign some religious
bodies greater legitimacy than others. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
There is a rich scholarly literature debating these issues and the difficult
questions they raise. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed
Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 234 (1989) (“In spite
of the concept’s antiquity, courts and scholars continue to battle over what does
and does not constitute a religion.”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion:
The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the
Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology,
Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 126
(2007) (debating what exactly constitutes religion in the United States). In the
spirit of candor, we note that even the authors of this Article have different
instincts concerning these issues. One of us has a provisionally narrow view of
what constitutes “religion” in American law, while the other two lean toward a
broader or even maximalist definition. All of us recognize the difficulties in each
possible approach.
In any event, the focus of this Article is not on defining religion. Instead, we
address a different question: given a practice that is understood to be religious—
under any specific operative definition—when should the government tolerate
the practice if it imposes harms on the children of the religious practitioners or
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review the scholarly literature and the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on how American constitutional law should and
does resolve these questions. Because these debates and doctrines
are familiar to scholars and students, our review of the literature
and law is brief.
We conclude this Part by suggesting that the United States
has privileged accommodationism over non-accommodationism in
constitutional and statutory law as compared with other Western
democracies,
though
its
accommodationist
stance
is
18
inconsistent.
A. Accommodation vs. Non-Accommodation: The Scholarly
Debates
From a broad and abstract perspective, the question of
whether to accommodate religious groups’ special needs and
practices can be seen as part of a broader question. Should society
generally demand conformity and assimilation to liberal norms
and policies preferred by the majority, or—taking a “live and let
live” approach—should the law allow minority and nonconformist
groups and individuals to live their lives and order their
communities as they see fit? This question extends well beyond
the issue of accommodation of religious practices. The broader
question is one of political philosophy, and political philosophers
and others have had a good deal to say about it. 19 It follows that
on third parties?
18. Compare infra notes 31–43, 125–129 and accompanying text (noting
that Congress enacted—with near unanimity—the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), which subject even incidental restrictions on religious
groups to strict scrutiny, thereby requiring frequent special accommodations
and exceptions for religious groups), with infra notes 44–47, 130–141 and
accompanying text (noting issues and situations where American law is not so
deferential to religious beliefs, such as those involving discrimination, animus,
mistrust, indifference, lack of awareness, or political self-interest).
19. Paul Weithman characterizes liberal democracy as entailing “moral
commitments which are in some way normative for its citizens. Among the most
important of these are commitments to liberty and equality, religion toleration,
self-government, majoritarianism, the rule of law, and some measure of
church-state separation. The precise content and implications of these
commitments are matters of disagreement.” PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 1 (2002). While all self-described liberals would
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likely agree with each of these principles in the abstract, when the principles
conflict with one another—as they do in the conflicts between majority practices
and non-conformists’ groups practices—different philosophical instincts lead in
different directions. See generally GREGORY FERNANDO PAPPAS, PRAGMATISM IN
THE AMERICAS 231 (2011).
Two liberal–democratic impulses, those that enshrine majority rule and
equality together reflect a general privileging of the non-accommodationist
viewpoint, which roughly correlates with the familiar “melting pot” metaphor
for social integration. See id. at 231 (“For the cultural monist, the idea of the
‘melting pot’ ought to be the model for dealing with newcomers to American
culture.”). Society, through its elected leaders, determines its own values and
makes laws consistent with those values. Those laws, in turn, apply equally to
all, regardless of the individual’s own views as to the relative merits of the laws
and their underlying values.
But two of liberalism’s other core values are personal autonomy and
freedom. Even those who do not adhere to the Millian harm principle would
likely regard personal liberty as at least a prima facie good. See JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (1913) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others.”). Even those espousing the most
non-accommodationist position would temper these pure majority rules and
equality instincts with a concern for individual rights and freedoms. More
controversial is multiculturalism—the idea that groups themselves have rights
or prerogatives. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION IN MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1994) (explaining
multiculturalism and its different implications). This can be manifested in one
of several ways. Groups may have powers over their members, such as religious
control over family law in some nations. Id. Individuals within those groups may
either deserve exemption from general laws, for example, by being allowed to
use their own language, or may not be entitled to protection of the laws against
some actions of their cultural group or its members. Id.
However, liberal monists—what Richard Shweder calls imperial liberals—
insist that liberal ways of life “are objectively more valuable than illiberal ways
of life and should replace them.” Richard A. Shweder, Shouting at the Hebrews:
Imperial Liberalism v. Liberal Pluralism and the Practice of Male Circumcision,
5 L., CULTURE & HUMAN. 247, 247 (2009). Consequently, if a group’s practices
are deemed to be inconsistent with liberalism by the majority, they would not be
accommodated. Id. at 247. That is, sub-communities that reject the liberal
commitments to individual autonomy, freedom, and a degree of social equality
represent a threat to liberal ideals and to their predominance, and are
consequently disfavored by liberal monists. See id. at 248 (asserting that liberal
monists believe that practices they deem as “illiberal” should be disallowed in
society). For these reasons, scholars whom we would characterize as liberal
monists tend to see the ideal state as a secular liberal democracy that generally
rejects religious accommodation when accommodation would be at odds with
liberal commitments. Id. They would favor predominance of the central state
over intermediate organizations with thick beliefs, including, but not limited to,
religion. See generally Robert Audi, Moral Foundations of Liberal Democracy,
Secular Reasons, and Liberal Neutrality Toward the Good, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.,
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 197 (2005) (explaining the normative foundations of a
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liberal democracy).
A related tenet that theoreticians of liberal democracy may espouse is that
the state should vigorously protect a wide panoply of individual rights not only
against government but also against non-state actors, including families. See
generally James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371 (1994) (proposing that
children’s rights, as opposed to parents’ rights, should be the basis for protecting
the legal interests of children, and that parents should be confined to having
only child-rearing privileges, limited to actions that do not harm the child’s
interests). Thus, parents are said not to have rights with regard to their
children. See generally id. (arguing that children must be protected by the state from
their parents); Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055, 1078 (2010) (arguing that the state must protect the
immature by not giving parents unchecked authority over them).
In contrast to liberal monists, liberal pluralists “make room for
practices . . . whose moral foundations must be understood on more than, or
other than, liberal terms,” religious or not. Shweder, supra note 19, at 253. In
other words, liberal pluralism, which roughly correlates with the “salad bowl”
vision of social integration and diversity, accepts some practices that do not
comport with a liberal worldview. See id. at 261 (noting that the logic of liberal
pluralism leaves room for the toleration of illiberal practices and does not
demand a moral judgment calling for the universal replacement of illiberal
practices by liberal ones). There are two kinds of justifications for such liberal
pluralism: idealist and pragmatic. See id.at 265 (“[A] balance must be struck
between liberal and illiberal values to sustain any particular way of life.”).
Broadly speaking, idealist justifications suggest that pluralism is desirable,
either in the abstract or in the particular circumstances of a given society,
whereas pragmatic justifications suggest that regardless of whether pluralism is
desirable, it may nevertheless be necessary for a state to achieve its larger
goals. See id. (“[A]ny society that tried to keep everyone’s options open
everywhere and all the time would be following a recipe for producing chaos,
frustration and endless failures of trust and cooperation among members of the
same society . . . .”). To be sure, it is not always clear which category a
justification fits into, and some may have characteristics of both.
One clearly idealist justification for liberal pluralism asserts a principled
commitment to diversity. William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105
ETHICS 515, 523 (1995). As William Galston notes, “[L]iberalism is about the
protection of diversity.” Id. In this view, diversity itself is a valuable and
desirable end, and even groups that espouse illiberal positions must be
tolerated. Id. A related idea is that preserving rights of conscience serves as a
bulwark against moral totalitarianism. See Chapman, supra note 17, at 1494–99
(arguing that protection of conscience’s values promotes personal integrity and
undermines the totalization of morality by the government). From a pragmatic
standpoint, pluralism and accommodation may be necessary for the state to
maintain its legitimacy, which is necessary for ensuring broad obedience of the
law. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376–77 (2006) (asserting that a State’s legitimacy is
largely dependent on the population’s feelings toward its leaders and whether
the people feel that the State leaders are entitled to rule). That is, if the State
does not accommodate minority groups’ practices and preferences, the
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legal assertions in this area are likely to have a tacit or explicit
basis in political theory. In practical terms, the laws of a diverse
democratic state must provide a compromise among individuals
and groups with diverse viewpoints in this area, and we do not
attempt to resolve the basic philosophical differences.
Rather, we are concerned with the narrower question of
whether the law should provide special accommodations for
practices that are motivated by religious conscience. That is, does
religion have features entitling people who act out of sincere
religious belief to receive special dispensation from the state
under circumstances in which those who undertake similar
actions for non-religious reasons would be punished? Here, too,
the literature is rich. 20 Proponents of religious accommodation

legitimacy of the State may corrode. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
xxviii (William Rehg trans., 1988) (“[T]he law employed by the State . . . must
itself be legitimated through a broader discourse of citizens and their
representatives.”); see also Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with
the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1054 (2012) (arguing that citizens are more likely to obey
State officials when they believe that the institution acts according to their
shared moral purposes).
20. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 50 (2007) (arguing for a neutral approach to
religion); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 1
(2013) (arguing for protection of both religion and conscience claims under the
Free Exercise Clause); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 8 (2013)
(arguing that religious claims of conscience should not be given preferential
treatment to secular claims of conscience); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm
Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 572–74 (1998) (arguing that there are no plausible
explanations supporting religious exemptions); Micah Schwartzman, What If
Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1378 (2012) (arguing that
religion deserves no special treatment from a moral perspective). But see
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 689–94 (1992) (arguing that religion is
special and must be treated with more than formal neutrality); Michael W.
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)
(“My thesis is that ‘singling out religion’ for special constitutional protection is
fully consistent with our constitutional tradition.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1597, 1609 (1997) (reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE
FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)) (commenting that the core reason for religious liberty is
that the founding generation singled out religion for special protection because
of its intrinsic importance).
AND
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argue that religion is indeed special. 21 Micah Schwartzman has
summarized their arguments as follows:
[T]he
main
normative
argument
for
religious
accommodation is based on the idea that religious believers
have an inalienable right to pursue salvation according to the
dictates of their consciences. The explicitly religious premise of
this argument is that God, or some transcendent authority,
has imposed duties on mankind and that fulfillment of those
duties takes priority over complying with positive law . . . . To
avoid infringing on [the duty to obey God], the state should
minimize conflicts between legal and religious duties, which it
can do partly by granting exemptions from laws that burden
religious practices.
A second and related argument for religious accommodation
is that when religious believers are forced to choose between
their religious and legal duties, they experience greater
suffering than nonbelievers faced with similar moral conflicts.
Because believers affirm the existence of a transcendent
authority and fear extratemporal punishments, they are
anguished in ways that nonbelievers are not. 22

On the other hand, opponents of religious accommodation
argue “that privileging religious over secular claims violates a
fundamental principle of neutrality,” because in “singling out
religion for special treatment, the government discriminates
impermissibly against nonbelievers and sends a message that
their views have an inferior status in the law.” 23 Thus, for
example, Eisgruber and Sager assert that the state is not obliged
“to accept a religious believer’s judgment about the importance of
her religious interests as compared to the legitimate secular
interests of the state.” 24 In this view, religious values and actions
flowing from them should never be privileged over secular ones. 25
21. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 1365–66 (providing
arguments and reasoning used by proponents of religious accommodation in
support of the proposition that religion deserves accommodation in society).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1374.
24. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1286 (1994).
25. See id. (“[T]he deep interests of individuals figure into but do not
override the secular concerns of the state . . . .”).
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B. Accommodation vs. Non-Accommodation: Tracing the Supreme
Court’s Approach
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” 26 The Supreme Court has vacillated in its
understanding of what the latter guarantee, the Free Exercise
Clause, requires in terms of religious accommodation. 27 In its
case of first impression, Reynolds v. United States, 28 decided
ninety years after the First Amendment was enacted, the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special
accommodations for religious believers. 29 Thus, the Reynolds
Court held that states could enforce a statute criminalizing
bigamy even against defendants whose bigamy was motivated by
sincere religious beliefs. 30
However, in its seminal 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 31
the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause more robustly and
announced that strict scrutiny would apply to any law that
substantially—though incidentally—interfered with a person’s
religious beliefs or religiously-motivated conduct. 32 Under this
new rule, to interfere with religious practices, the government
would have to articulate a compelling interest and demonstrate
that there was no less intrusive means of achieving the state’s
interest. 33
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–68 (1878)
(concluding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special
accommodations for religious believers); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–
03 (1963) (finding that government may not infringe upon religious beliefs
without a compelling purpose).
28. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
29. See id. at 167 (reasoning that to “permit this [religious exemption]
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances”).
30. See id. (concluding that a person cannot be excused from committing a
crime simply because he does so in the name of religion).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32. See id. at 402 (“The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly
closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs . . . .”).
33. See id. at 403 (noting that the government may regulate if certain
religious beliefs or practices pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or
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Subsequent opinions eroded the Court’s commitment to strict
scrutiny. 34 In Goldman v. Weinberger, 35 the Court rejected the
application of strict scrutiny in the military context, where the
plaintiff argued that the military’s dress policy interfered with
his right to wear a yarmulke on his head. 36 In O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 37 the Court ruled that strict scrutiny also did not apply
in the prison context. 38 Cases involving American Indians,
including Bowen v. Roy 39 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 40 further weakened the strict scrutiny regime. 41
To be sure, the Supreme Court frequently carves out denials to
servicemen and prisoners that it permits to other citizens on the
grounds that servicemen have waived and prisoners have
forfeited some of their liberties; 42 and cases involving American
Indians may also be seen as unique, as the rights claimed by
order).
34. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986)
(concluding that the First Amendment does not require the military to
accommodate certain religiously held practices if it would not be in the
military’s best interest); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)
(reasoning that the First Amendment does not prevent prisons from exercising
their best judgment in running a prison).
35. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
36. See id. at 509–10 (“[T]he First Amendment does not require the
military to accommodate such practices in the face of its view that they would
detract from the uniformity sought by the dress regulations.”).
37. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
38. See id. at 353 (“[C]oncerns of prison administrators provide adequate
support for the conclusion that accommodations of respondents’ request to
attend Jumu’ah would have undesirable results in the institution. These
difficulties also make clear that there are no obvious, easy alternatives to the
policy adopted by petitioners.”).
39. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
40. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
41. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695–98 (requiring appellants to obtain a Social
Security card for their daughter even though appellants claim it violates their
Native American religious beliefs); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441–42 (finding that the
First Amendment did not preclude appellants from completing a road or from
permitting timber harvesting on Indian religious grounds because those
religious practices must yield to higher consideration).
42. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 525 (1986) (“Except as
otherwise required by ‘interests of the highest order,’ soldiers as well as civilians
are entitled to follow the dictates of their faiths.”); O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348
(citing cases that note that lawfully imprisoned individuals give up at least
some constitutional rights).
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American Indians have a political component as well as a
religious component because of treaties that Indian tribes signed
ceding some, but not all, of their sovereignty to the federal
government. 43
Eventually, in 1990, the Court reversed Sherbert and rolled
back strict scrutiny for all persons under its jurisdiction in its
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith. 44 Smith had argued
that he should not be fired from his job for ingesting peyote, a
hallucination-inducing drug, as part of a religious ceremony. 45 In
rejecting this claim, the Court promulgated a new standard,
holding that the Constitution does not require strict scrutiny of
general laws with secular intent that are neutrally applied and
that only incidentally interfere with religious practices. 46 Because
the prohibition on peyote was neutrally applied to all, and was
neither intended to burden nor applied to discriminate against
religious users, it was presumptively valid; the Free Exercise
Clause did not protect Smith. 47
The Court has continued to adhere to Smith’s general rule
but has refined it. 48 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.

43. See, e.g., Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme
Court’s Changing Stance on Tribal Sovereignty, AM. BAR ASS’N (1995),
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp
_solo_magazine_index/marshall.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (discussing the
effects of treaties between the United States and Native American tribes on
tribal sovereignty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990) (“It is no more
appropriate for judges to determine the centrality of religious beliefs before
applying a compelling interest test in the free exercise field, than it would be for
them to determine the importance of ideas before applying the compelling
interest test in the free speech field.”).
45. Id. at 874.
46. See id. at 892 (“The Court today extracts from our long history of free
exercise precedents the single categorical rule that if prohibiting the exercise of
religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”).
47. See id. at 879 (“Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”).
48. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531–32 (1993) (striking down an ordinance that was not neutral or
generally applicable and did not contain a compelling government interest).
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City of Hialeah, 49 the Court struck down a local ordinance that
interfered with animal sacrifice by members of the Santeria
religion. 50 The Court reasoned that the ordinance in question,
though perhaps facially neutral, was not neutral in effect because
it had been deliberately crafted to target a religious practice. 51
Most recently, in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 52 the Court
incorporated a ministerial exception into its Free Exercise
doctrine, holding that anti-discrimination laws, though neutral
and generally applicable, could not apply to restrict a religious
organization’s decisions concerning employment of its ministers,
defined as “those who will personify [a church’s] beliefs.” 53
This is essentially where constitutional doctrine stands
today. Truly neutral laws of general applicability do not violate
the Free Exercise Clause and are presumptively valid, except in
the context of religious organizations’ ministerial employment
decisions, and perhaps their internal regulations and behavior
more broadly. 54
C. Beyond Philosophy and Constitutionalism:
Accommodationism Today
In navigating between the poles of accommodation and
non-accommodation, all modern liberal societies have staked out
middle grounds, seeking to balance the interests on both sides.
American politics
have
generally
produced
a more
accommodationist stance than those adopted by some other

49. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
50. Id. at 547.
51. See id. at 534 (“Official action that targets religious conduct for
distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the
requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”).
52. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
53. Id. at 697.
54. See id. at 702 (allowing religious groups to shape their own faith and
mission through its ministerial appointments); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (concluding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate
the Free Exercise Clause).
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liberal democracies even though this has not been required since
Smith. 55
For example, Scandinavian attitudes tend to lean toward
non-accommodation, as expressed in the compulsory education
requirements in Finland, 56 Denmark bans on both the Jewish
and Islamic ritual slaughter of animals on the grounds that
“animal rights come before religion,” 57 and Danish and Swedish
medical associations’ recommendation to ban ritual male infant
circumcision, though the governments of these countries have not
banned circumcision currently. 58 France has banned religious
clothing—veils, turbans, yarmulkes, hijabs, and so on—from the
public classroom and has outlawed veils that cover one’s face in
most public places. 59 Scandinavian countries come to
non-accommodation of minority religions in part from their
tradition in Christianity, whereas France has a long history of
55. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (finding that a law prohibiting the ingestion
of peyote was neutral, generally applicable—not targeting any specific religion—
and therefore valid).
56. See Peter Wilby, Finland’s Education Ambassador Spreads the Word,
THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ education/2013/jul/
01/education-michael-gove-finland-gcse (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (explaining
Finland’s education system, including the requirement that children attend
school from the age of seven to sixteen) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
57. Adam Withnall, Denmark Bans Kosher and Halal Slaughter as
Minister Says ‘Animal Rights Come Before Religion’, THE INDEP. (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/denmark-bans-halal-andkosher-slaughter-as-minister-says-animal-rights-come-before-religion9135580.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
58. See Lydia Smith, Sweden and Denmark Recommend Ban on
Non-Medical Circumcision of Boys, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sweden-denmark-recommend-ban-non-medicalcircumcision-boys-1434354 (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (“In Denmark, the Danish
College of General Practitioners penned a statement that denounced
circumcision was akin to abuse and mutilation. In a poll undertaken by the
newspaper BT, it was revealed that 87% were in favour of a ban on the
procedure.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See Elaine Ganely, French School Bans Muslim Girl from Wearing
Long Skirt, Prompting Twitter Backlash, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/29/french-muslim-skirtban_n_7170140.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (explaining why a girl was
banned from class for wearing religious clothing) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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freedom of religious belief combined with exclusion of religion
from the public sphere. 60
In contrast, the United States seems to lean more toward
accommodationism even in the absence of any constitutional
obligation. 61 Lupu and Tuttle have observed that “[r]eligious
activity and pluralism in the United States far outstrip that of
any other Western nation, yet religious strife has played no
significant part in our history.” 62 Our anti-totalitarian country is
one of hyphenated identities, multiculturalist and tolerant ethos,
and individualist self-conception. 63 This pluralist impulse extends
beyond just religious accommodationism, though it is perhaps
most evident and pronounced in that context. 64
Our accommodationist tendencies may arise from political
and cultural attitudes and discourse that date back to our
country’s founding ideals and immigrant history. 65 As George
Washington wrote to the Jewish community of Newport, Rhode
Island, “the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to
persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under
its protection should demean themselves as good citizens.” 66
60. See Andrew M. Greeley, Religious Decline in Europe?, AM. NAT’L
CATHOLIC REV. (Mar. 1, 2004), http://americamagazine.org/issue/475/
article/religious-decline-europe (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (stating that religion
in France is declining, while there are high rates of atheism and nonaffiliation)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See generally Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at
1617 (addressing the surprising degree of religious accommodation adopted by
elected officials).
62. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities
in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 39 (2002).
63. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1660
(suggesting that religious tolerance is “deeply embedded in our collective
identity”).
64. See id. (positing that Americans’ customs involving religious
accommodation spill over into other areas of life).
65. See id. (discussing American history and self-identity).
66. Letter from George Washington to Touro Synagogue (1790), AM.
TREASURES OF THE LIB. OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/
trm006.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). This, of course, begs the question of what is a good citizen.
Requiring more of a good citizen than generally obeying the laws and not
knowingly working against the interests of the nation would exclude many
people who are not ordinarily thought of as bad citizens, but who are simply
indifferent to public affairs. Using as minimal a test as bothering to vote would
still exclude many people from the ranks of good citizens. See Lawrence Ezrow
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As we will demonstrate, the structure of our government and
the nature of interest group politics also contribute to this
tolerant and accommodationist dynamic. 67 All of that said, this
general embrace of pluralism is hardly complete or consistent. 68
1. Constitutional Expressions of Accommodationism and Their
Limits
Those parts of the Bill of Rights that most clearly reflect the
accommodationist mindset include the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause, 69 Free Exercise Clause, 70 and Free Speech
Clause. 71 Each of these stands, at least, for two propositions: That
individuals cannot be compelled to conform to a particular
religious or secular viewpoint, and that they retain sufficient
autonomy to reject the beliefs and values of the majority or of the
government itself. 72
& Georgios Xezonakis, Satisfaction with Democracy and Voter Turnout: A
Temporal Perspective, PARTY POL. 1, 3 (2014), http://privatewww.essex.
ac.uk/~ezrow/publications/Satisfaction%20with%20Democracy%20and%20Voter%
20Turnout.pdf (documenting that voter turnout in twelve democracies in
Western and Southern Europe from 1976 to 2011, and ranging from 60% to
85%); see also Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2012—
Detailed Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2012/tables.html (last updated May 8,
2013) (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (documenting that fewer than 65% of eligible
Americans in the United States voted in the most recent presidential election)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1657 (“[The
United States] is among the most religiously tolerant and accommodating
country in the world, with religious minority groups enjoying overwhelming
liberty, thanks largely to the beneficence of the majoritarian branches of
government.”).
68. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the road blocks the First Amendment
places on state and federal government action in the interest of preserving
freedom of speech and religion).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making any law
“respecting an establishment of religion”).
70. See id. (denying Congress the power to prohibit the free exercise of
religion).
71. See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
72. The consistent overruling of government action even where
governmental interests would appear to be strong demonstrates the high value
placed on such propositions. See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text
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Education law offers an illuminating example of the embrace
of religious exercise and individualist expression. 73 Schooling is
one of the few widely shared experiences in our society and is, to
boot, a formative experience for future participants in our
political and social culture. Enormous resources are devoted to
our public schools, 74 in part because an educated citizenry is
widely considered fundamental to the viability of our national
project. 75 If ever the state had an interest in conformity and
enforced participation in its pursuit of the public good,
compulsory public education with a common curriculum would be
a superb expression of this interest. 76
Yet the Supreme Court has read the Speech and Religion
Clauses to drastically constrain the ability of the state to
inculcate even the most basic civic values when doing so conflicts
with parents’ religious or philosophical commitments and
affiliations. For instance, the state is prohibited from mandating
attendance at public schools, 77 from restricting the subjects that
may be taught to children, 78 from limiting even information
(comparing cases in which the government survived and failed First
Amendment challenges).
73. See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (citing cases ruling—
fairly consistently—in favor of freedom of religion and speech, except where
plaintiffs failed to establish an actual burden or the state action was neutral
with respect to religion).
74. See generally Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate
Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483 (1998) (discussing the amount of
resources poured into public education but lamenting the discrepancies in
funding across public schools).
75. See id. at 484 (“[Education] is required in the performance of our most
basic responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship.” (quoting
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))).
76. See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory
public school attendance laws).
77. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (finding Wisconsin’s
compulsory school attendance law to unduly burden defendant’s rights under
the Free Exercise Clause). While Wisconsin did have an interest in ensuring
that children are “self-reliant and self-sufficient” members of society, the Court
found that the additional two years mandated by the law “would do little to
serve those interests.” Id. at 221–22.
78. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (finding Louisiana’s
Creationism Act—forbidding the teaching of the theory of evolution without also
teaching “creation science”—violative of the Establishment Clause because it
lacked a “clear secular purpose”).
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deemed transgressive that is available to students, 79 or from
demanding expressions of fealty and allegiance to the
government. 80 Parents are allowed to send their children to
non-government schools, 81 and the state may even provide cash
vouchers 82 and tax deductions for private school—including
religious school—tuition. 83
More generally, although the precise contours of the
Constitution’s speech and religion guarantees are subject to
contention, all would at least agree with the fundamental
proposition that the government is constitutionally barred from
imposing on its citizens any single ideological vision, religious or
secular. 84 Thus, the courts have been clear that the guarantee of
freedom of speech protects expression of even the most
marginalized and disagreeable ideas. 85 If a public institution
79. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (finding the Board of
Education’s rejection of books it deemed “anti-Christian,” “anti-American,” etc.
violative of the First Amendment).
80. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(invalidating a state statute mandating students to salute the American flag in
school). The plaintiffs’ religion forbade worshipping a symbol—in the present
case, the American flag. Id. Therefore, by mandating the salute, the law violated
the First Amendment by compelling plaintiffs to act against their faith. Id. But
see Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987)
(upholding the use of certain textbooks in school because plaintiffs failed to
show that reading the textbooks posed an actual burden on their free exercise of
religion).
81. Compare Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925)
(declaring an Oregon statute—requiring public school attendance and
forbidding private school attendance—unconstitutional), with Jonathan L. v.
Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1074, 1101 (2008) (declaring that there is no
absolute constitutional right to home school one’s children), and El Paso Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. McIntyre, 457 S.W.3d 475, 499 (Tex. App. 2014) (same).
82. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002) (finding a
state plan subsidizing private school tuition neutral with respect to religion
because aid was granted based on secular criteria).
83. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1983) (validating a state
law granting deductions for expenditures on school supplies that predominantly
benefitted parents of children attending parochial schools).
84. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
85. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011)
(declaring a California statute banning the rental of violent video games to
minors unconstitutional and noting that video games qualify for First
Amendment protection); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010)

TO ACCOMMODATE OR NOT

937

chooses to rent its facilities to private groups, it is prohibited
from excluding religious groups or groups with disfavored views
from the opportunity to rent the facilities. 86 If a legislative body
chooses to permit a religious invocation during proceedings, it
may not select speakers based on the degree to which their beliefs
or expressions comport with the state’s own values. 87 If a
religious display is erected on public property, it will only be
upheld as constitutional if enough secular or competing religious
symbols are included to make clear to the viewer that the
message being conveyed is one of pluralism. 88 Religious non-profit
organizations, as well as intimate and expressive associational
groups, generally are not subject to anti-discrimination laws that
interfere with their own core values and autonomy. 89 And under
our Constitution, there are no officially recognized religious
(invalidating a federal law aimed to illegalize the distribution of depictions of
animal cruelty); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (finding
a portion of a statute banning the production of virtual child pornography
unconstitutional because the material was neither obscene nor “‘intrinsically
related’ to the sexual abuse of children” (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 759 (1982))); Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009) (allowing
an anti-homosexual demonstration near a service member’s funeral); Robb v.
Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the regulation that
prevented the Ku Klux Klan from adopting a highway was unconstitutional);
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978) (invalidating prohibitions
that prevented Nazi demonstrations). But see generally Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (upholding a statute banning material support to
designated terrorist organizations). In Humanitarian Law Project, instructing
terrorist group members how to use the law to settle disputes was considered
“material support;” and the Court therefore found that the statute was not
unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 25–28.
86. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a school
that created a forum open to student groups could not exclude religious groups
from using the facilities).
87. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983) (holding that
Nebraska’s practice of opening its legislative sessions with a prayer was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause because “there is no indication that the
prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief”).
88. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (allowing a city to
display a crèche because it also has a secular purpose).
89. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–40 (1987) (holding that a religious
exemption to the prohibition against religious discrimination in employment
does not violate the Establishment Clause because religious organizations have
an interest in autonomy in selecting their leaders and employees).
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spokespeople or representatives. 90 Each person is entitled to her
own religious views and commitments, however idiosyncratic,
and is thus entitled to the same religious freedoms as anyone
else. 91
Beyond the First Amendment, other constitutional
guarantees also resonate with a broadly tolerant approach.
Lawrence v. Texas 92 held that under the Due Process Clause, the
state may not legislate on the basis of morality alone. 93 The Due
Process Clause and other constitutional provisions have been
held to fundamentally guarantee a measure of bodily and sexual
autonomy, privacy, and the right to parent one’s children. 94 These
rights reinforce the limits of the state’s ability to impose the
majority’s moral values on the minority. 95
Even the Constitution’s basic structural elements protect
dissenters. Our federalist structure allows different states to
preserve their different characters. 96 State constitutions and
statutes
further
devolve
governmental
authority
to
97
Thus,
municipalities, counties, and local school boards.
90. This is likely the result of the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. See id. (prohibiting any law dealing with the establishment of religion).
92. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
93. See id. at 578–79 (“The State cannot demean [petitioners’] existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
94. See id. at 573–74 (stating that the laws give protection to “decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education” (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992))); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (finding
a statute outlawing teachers from teaching students languages other than
English “arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the
competency of the State”).
95. This proposition is best exemplified by Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 582 (finding that “moral disapproval is [not] a legitimate state interest
to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual
sodomy”).
96. See William G. Buss, Essay, An Essay on Federalism, Separation of
Powers, and the Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 391, 396 (1998) (“A most elementary principle of American constitutional
law is that the United States Constitution creates a ‘federal system,’ under
which sovereign power is divided between the national government and state
governments.” (citation omitted)).
97. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, paras. I–II (giving legislative power to
counties and cities).
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returning to the education law context, it would be exceedingly
difficult for the federal government to impose any uniform
curriculum or character on the public school system. 98
Additionally, the counter-majoritarian structural features of the
federal government—small states enjoy equal representation in
the Senate 99 and overrepresentation in the Electoral College’s
vote for President 100—and the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment 101 together make it difficult for the government to
pass laws over strong minority opposition. This further works to
protect minorities and dissenters—religious and otherwise—from
having a monist vision imposed upon them.
To be sure, the constitutional embrace of tolerance,
pluralism, diversity, and accommodationism is not absolute, nor
can it be. 102 Unfettered, it would result in chaos and anarchism,
as each individual or group would be left free to follow its own
will and practices, unrestrained by any governmental
authority. 103 Law and organized society would be impossible in
the face of unbridled pluralism; courts have struggled to balance
the promise of individual freedom against the needs for law and
order, the equal application of law to all groups, and the
protection of individuals throughout society. 104 This has proven
98. See generally JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM
(2014) (comparing and contrasting the tensions between the state and
intermediate groups such as religious groups and universities).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
100. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
101. Id. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3.
102. Content-based restrictions on speech are perfect examples of such
logical limitations. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942) (affording no First Amendment protection to “fighting words”); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
a panic.”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (excluding child
pornography from First Amendment protection).
103. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (stating that every
regulation of conduct that does not protect a religious interest cannot be
presumptively invalid because it “would be courting anarchy”).
104. For example, courts have attempted to address these issues with
varying levels of scrutiny analyses in the Equal Protection context. See Clark v.
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“At minimum, a statutory classification must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based
on race or national origin, and classifications affecting fundamental rights are
given [strict] scrutiny . . . . [I]ntermediate scrutiny . . . applie[s] to discriminatory
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even more elusive in the context of the state’s relationship with
religion. 105
For example, in Locke v. Davey, 106 the Court held that a state
is permitted to exclude students studying religion from a
scholarship program that supported all other courses of study. 107
This seems to reflect the relatively non-accommodationist
viewpoint that laws may favor the study of secular subjects over
that of religious subjects. Even more significantly, in Christian
Legal Society Chapter of the University of California v.
Martinez, 108 the Court held that a state university could condition
its support for a student group on its willingness to allow all
students to participate equally in the group’s activities and
governance, even where doing so would conflict with a group’s
religious or expressive viewpoint. 109 This, too, expressed a
non-accommodationist approach, for it allows the state to
privilege its own vision of inclusivity over a religious or
expressive group’s preference for exclusivity, even to the extent of
allowing public universities to require as a condition for
recognition that religious organizations admit members who do
not belong to the religion to whose purposes the group is
dedicated. And, as we have already seen, in some cases even
before Employment Division v. Smith, when strict scrutiny
purportedly applied to laws that conflicted with minority
religious practices, the Court nonetheless upheld the government
policy. 110 Finally, in its decision in Smith, the Court struck a
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”).
105. See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (citing cases that discuss
freedom of religion).
106. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
107. See id. at 725 (“Given the historic and substantial state interest
[against the establishment of religion] at issue, it cannot be concluded that the
denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently
constitutionally suspect.”).
108. 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
109. See id. at 698 (allowing a state university to require that a Christian
group allow non-Christians the opportunity for full participation as a condition
for university financial support).
110. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text (finding alleged
encumbrances on the exercise of religion valid in limited public forums—where
the institution’s policies are reasonable and viewpoint neutral—as well as in
distribution of scholarship aid); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254
(1982) (upholding the constitutionality of mandatory social security taxes even
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powerful blow against constitutionally guaranteed religious
accommodationism, holding that lawmakers need not specially
accommodate religious groups under the Free Exercise Clause as
long as the law is neutral and generally applicable. 111 Such laws
thus are presumptively valid despite their intrusion on a person’s
ability to live in accordance with her own religious practices. 112
In short, a greater degree of tolerance, minority protection,
and religious accommodationism is embedded in the American
constitutional framework than in those of some other Western
democracies, but the Court’s commitment to such a reading of the
Constitution has hardly been absolute or consistent.
2. Statutory Expressions of Accommodationism and Their Limits
The majoritarian branches of government have gone far
beyond what the Supreme Court has required in accommodating
religious freedom. 113 For instance, the Tax Code gives favorable
treatment to religious organizations, whether or not they share
the majority’s values. 114 From the time of the founding, Congress
has allowed conscientious objectors to refuse to be drafted into
the military, determining that even when it comes to society’s
basic need to provide for its own protection, dissenting groups
when it violated the Amish taxpayer’s religion).
111. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (finding that the Free
Exercise Clause permits a state to deny unemployment benefits to a person
discharged for drug use—even if the drug is used for religious purposes—if it is
a valid and neutral law of general applicability).
112. See id. at 888 (“[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively
invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that
does not protect an interest of the highest order.”).
113. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1642–56
(discussing the interplay between the legislative and judiciary branches in
accommodating, as well as hindering, religious freedom); see also James E.
Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445–46 (1992) (finding that there were over
2,000 religious exemptions to generally applicable laws and stating that the
political process was protective of religious freedom).
114. See id. at 1456 (“The tax laws contain numerous exemptions for
religious groups and allow deductions for contributions to religious
organizations.”). But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598–99
(1983) (holding that a racially discriminatory private school may not enjoy tax
exemptions).
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should not be compelled to violate their religious or philosophical
worldviews. 115
More recently, federal and state legislatures have provided
similar conscience clauses to allow medical professionals to
decline to perform sterilization or pregnancy termination
procedures or even to prescribe contraceptives on the basis of
their religious beliefs. 116 Similarly, states may require
vaccination of children, but all but three have religious or
philosophical exemptions to vaccination requirements. 117 Such
exemptions put children at risk and have the potential to
contribute to epidemics outside the community that refuses
vaccination. 118
115. See Paul M. Landskroener, Note, Not the Smallest Grain of Incense:
Free Exercise and Conscientious Objection to Draft Registration, 25 VAL. U. L.
REV. 455, 455 (1991) (noting that draft exemptions for conscious objectors in the
United States have existed since colonial times).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2012)
The Federal Government, and any State or local government that
receives Federal financial assistance, may not subject any health care
entity to discrimination on the basis that . . . (1) the entity refuses to
undergo training in the performance of induced abortions, to require
or provide such training, to perform such abortions . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (“Prohibition of public officials and public authorities from
imposition of certain requirements contrary to religious beliefs or moral
convictions [with regard to abortions or sterilization] . . . .”); Levin, Rethinking
Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1650 (discussing state and federal statutes
allowing medical professionals to refuse to provide care related to abortion or
sterilization).
VACCINE
INFO.
CTR.,
117. See
Vaccine
Laws,
NAT’L
http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (listing West
Virginia and Mississippi as the only states that do not provide a religious
exemption to vaccination) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See Allan J. Jacobs, Needles and Notebooks: The Limits of Requiring
Immunization for School Attendance, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 171, 175–77 (2010)
(providing the scientific reasoning for vaccination). See also generally Amy A.
Parker et al., Implications of a 2005 Measles Outbreak in Indiana for Sustained
Elimination of Measles in the United States, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 447 (2006)
(discussing the vaccination of measles and its effects). At the time these Articles
were published, only Mississippi and West Virginia had no non-medical
exemptions; California recently enacted a statute, SB277, requiring full
immunization as a condition for a child to attend a school or child care facility,
with only medical exemptions permitted. See Michelle M. Mello, David M.
Studdert & Wendy E. Parmet, Shifting Vaccination Politics—The End of
Personal-Belief Exemptions in California, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 785, 785–87
(2015) (discussing California’s tighter policy on mandatory vaccinations in light
of SB277’s passage).
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Reflecting a similarly accommodationist approach, all states
allow parents to homeschool their children, though there may be
good reasons to limit homeschooling. 119 The Supreme Court has
never interpreted the Constitution to require such
accommodation, which may constrain a child’s options in life and
interfere with society’s interest in developing a uniformly
educated and acculturated citizenry. 120 Nevertheless, all states
give parents the right to homeschool their children. 121
Likewise, Congress—not the Court—acted to ensure that
religious service members would be permitted to wear religious
symbols. 122 Indeed, in a variety of areas, Congress, state
legislatures, and administrative agencies have gone well beyond
what the Court has required in accommodating the unique needs
of diverse religious minority groups, such as Native Americans,
Amish, and Orthodox Jews. 123 There are thousands of statutory
provisions—and many more administrative and local policies—
that protect and assist religious minority groups by granting
them special treatment and accommodations, further reflecting a
broadly pluralist viewpoint—at least, legislatively. 124
Most important, after the Supreme Court rolled back
protections of religious groups’ practices in its Smith decision—
finding that religious groups are not constitutionally entitled to
legislative accommodation 125—Congress responded by enacting
119. See McMullen, supra note 8, at 83 (noting that homeschooling may
stunt the development of social skills in children).
120. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (comparing cases discussing
mandatory public school attendance laws and homeschooling issues).
121. See State Laws, HSLDA, https://www.hslda.org/laws/ (last visited Jan.
19, 2016) (providing a map of the United States, color coding states in
accordance with varying levels of homeschooling regulation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
122. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2012) (“[A] member of the armed forces may wear
an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the member’s armed
force.”).
123. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1647
(discussing Congress’s response to different Supreme Court cases involving
religious exceptions for Native Americans, Amish, and Orthodox Jews).
124. See id. (identifying the legislature as the driving accommodationist
force behind religious freedom).
125. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (“[T]o say that a
nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is
desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required . . . .”).
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(with near unanimity) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) 126 and subsequently, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 127 Several states enacted
parallel measures. 128 These statutes starkly reveal firm
commitment to religious pluralism by subjecting even incidental
restrictions on religious groups to strict scrutiny, thereby
requiring frequent special accommodations and exceptions for
religious groups. 129
Here too, though, the embrace of accommodation has its
limits. Some limits are uncontroversial; for example, organized
society cannot accommodate a religious group’s obligation to
commit ritual murder, no matter how sincerely held the religious
belief is. 130 Thus, RFRA and the other laws modeled on it do not
impose a universal requirement that lawmakers accommodate
religious practices. 131 Where a law is the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling interest, the statute satisfies RFRA
despite its substantial interference with religious practices. 132 To
be sure, opinions differ as to what constitutes a compelling
interest and how to apply the “least restrictive means” test. 133
126. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994)).
127. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc—2000cc-5 (2000)).
128. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A
Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010) (discussing state RFRAs). For
an updated list of state RFRAs, see State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/re
search/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (last visited Jan. 19,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See Lund, supra note 128, at 5 (providing the operative part of
Arizona’s RFRA statute establishing a strict scrutiny analysis requirement).
130. As compared to a state law establishing neutral and generally
applicable laws that also hinder a group’s practice of an essential religious
ritual. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (disqualifying certain
individuals, who ritually consumed peyote, from unemployment benefits).
131. They do, however, limit governmental interference. See Lund, supra
note 128, at 5 (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if . . . .” (emphasis added)).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (“Government may substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.”).
133. Id.
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The large volume of litigation attests to the magnitude of
disagreement on the extent of protection offered by RFRA and
similar statutes. 134
Federal antidiscrimination laws further demonstrate the
limits of statutory pluralism in the United States. The federal
Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and so on, include no
exceptions for religious groups and individuals, and state laws in
these areas have mostly followed suit. 135 Recent legislative
debates concerning extending such laws to protect people on the
basis of sexual orientation often revolve around whether, when,
and how to accommodate religious objectors, 136 but most states
that have passed such statutes have declined to include religious
exceptions (except to religious non-profit institutions). 137 At
times, courts have held that the Constitution protects some
groups’ rights to discriminate on the grounds of speech interests
or religious freedom but in these cases, the legislatures have
largely decided that the state’s interest—whether economic,
philosophical, or dignitary—in prohibiting certain forms of
discrimination overrides the general commitment to religious
accommodationism. 138
Finally, lawmakers sometimes reject requested religious
accommodations and restrict religious practices for a variety of
other reasons: animus, mistrust, indifference, lack of awareness,
134. See generally, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2785 (2014) (finding that the RFRA protected closely-held for-profit corporations
from the HHS contraceptives mandate); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (interpreting the RFRA to
allow an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for the use of hoasca).
135. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012); Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012).
136. See, e.g., Nick Smith, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill Debated,
BISMARCK TRIB. (Mar. 23, 2015), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/govtand-politics/sexual-orientation-discrimination-bill-debated/article_12dba16595e8-5230-81e9-9eda8b517049.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (discussing the
debate about a sexual discrimination bill and its effects on religious freedom)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013)
(holding that the New Mexico Human Rights Act does not provide an exception
for a photographer that refuses to photograph a commitment ceremony between
two women).
138. See id. (finding that the New Mexico Human Rights Act does not violate
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it is a neutral law of
general applicability).
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political self-interest, and so forth. 139 The more countercultural
and foreign the religious practice—the more “different” in other
words—the more it is at risk. 140 Lawmakers violate the
Constitution when they attempt to impose restrictions on
religious practices for some or all of these reasons, 141 but the
existence of such cases reflects the degree to which our dominant
accommodationist tendencies are inconsistently embraced in the
majoritarian branches.
III. Understanding Inconsistency: Religious Accommodation and
Non-Accommodation in the Political Economy
As we have seen, the United States is a fairly accommodating
nation for religious groups, but those accommodations are
inconsistently granted. 142 We now identify certain troubling
aspects of this lack of consistency and consider the political forces
that produce it. We conclude this Part by arguing that a greater
degree of consistency is necessary for ethical and legal reasons.

139. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1672
(discussing how the ordinance banning animal sacrifice was a result of mistrust
or animus towards adherents of Santería (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–39 (1993))).
140. See id. (finding a facially valid law unconstitutional as applied when
town officials specifically removed Jewish banners from public street poles while
leaving other banners in place (citing Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 178 (3d Cir. 2002))); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d
1111, 1116–18 (stating that Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment
preventing courts from considering Sharia law (Islamic religious law)); Laurie
Goodstein, Across Nation, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08mosque.html?pagewanted=all
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (discussing the zoning arguments against mosques)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 579 (1993) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice was
unconstitutional because it was directed at adherents of Santería); see also infra
note 269 and accompanying text (noting that Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood
transfusions primarily because of their obedience to God).
142. See supra Part II.C (comparing the differing approaches taken by the
judicial and legislative branches with regard to religion and freedom of speech).
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A. Is Inconsistency Troubling? In This Case, Yes.
Differences in the accommodation of claims for different sorts
of religious accommodations are not in themselves surprising or
necessarily troubling. 143 There are good arguments for and
against such accommodations, 144 and so we would not expect any
liberal democracy to be either absolutely accommodating or
absolutely unaccommodating. Thus, it is not difficult to
understand why we prohibit religiously motivated murder even
while we embrace many other religious accommodations. 145 There
is no contradiction here, for there is broad agreement that in the
extreme case of human sacrifice, the liberal values that require
society to protect human life and impose an absolute ban on
private killings easily supersede the values favoring individual
religious freedom. 146
Thus, some of our laws that decline to accommodate religious
objectors can be understood as principled efforts to balance the
benefits of religious liberty against its costs. 147 If all of the laws
143. As seen in Employment Division v. Smith, generally applicable laws
that are neither intended to limit nor applied to limit, nor only incidentally
limit, religious freedom are subject to a weaker scrutiny analysis. See 494 U.S.
872, 878 (1990) (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the
activity of printing) is not the object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has
not been offended.”).
144. See supra Part II.B (discussing the development, and loosening of,
strict scrutiny analyses in freedom of religion case law).
145. States have an interest in protecting their residents and, under their
police powers, have the power to establish laws governing health, safety, and
welfare. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (“The States’
traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public
health, safety, and morals, and such a basis for legislation has been upheld.”).
146. A similar analogy can be made to abortion cases. For example, the
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
found that, at the beginning of the third trimester of pregnancy, the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the life of the mother and the child, thus
permitting a state to illegalize third trimester abortions. 505 U.S. 833, 872
(1992).
147. Hence the focus on a law’s intent and the degree to which it impairs the
free exercise of religion; if a state passes a general law that happens to
incidentally affect the free exercise of religion without intent to do so, the courts
interpret this as a legitimate use of state power. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881
(“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
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concerning minority religious rights and their limits reflected
such a principled approach, then we would be unconcerned with
the lack of uniformity. Further, recognizing that different
policymakers and communities may balance the interests
differently in specific cases, we would even expect and accept for
different laws to encode different policymakers’ views as to the
proper balance. 148 Indeed, a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural,
multi-jurisdictional society such as ours is sure to produce
varying policies.
Perhaps the most noncontroversial operative balancing
principle is that a religious practice that imposes significant costs
or harms on participants in the practice or on third parties should
not be tolerated, but that in the absence of such harm, we should
be entirely accommodating of religious minorities’ deviations
from general social and legal expectations. 149 This essentially
encodes a Millian view that one person’s rights stop at another’s
nose. 150 Under this approach, virtually all would agree that ritual
murder imposes a significant harm, and therefore that it cannot
be tolerated. 151 In other cases, however, different groups will have
different views as to what constitutes a third-party cost or harm
that is significant enough to overcome American baseline
accommodationism. 152
in conjunction with other constitutional protections . . . .”).
148. A perfect example of biased policymaker views that the court found
troubling can be found in United States v. Windsor. See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693
(2013) (“The House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports
with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO.
104-664, at 16 (1996))).
149. As seen in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the government had an interest in an
educated citizenry, but the additional two years of required attendance did not
outweigh the burden placed on Amish people because the additional two years
would do little to promote the state interest. 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).
150. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In sum, with respect to free exercise claims no less
than free speech claims, ‘[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the
other man’s nose begins.’” (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in
War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919))); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
22–23 (1859) (explaining that liberty should be without impediment as long as it
does not harm others).
151. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing states’ inherent
police powers to protect the health and safety of the people within their state).
152. Take, for example, polygamy. While polygamy was a part of the
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The question of what constitutes a harm—or enough of a
harm—is not a trivial or easy one. 153 To take a straightforward
example, if we accommodate a Sabbath-observant Jew’s religious
need to leave her office early enough on a winter Friday to make
it home in time for the Sabbath, there may well be a cost imposed
on third parties—namely, the coworkers who must fill in during
her absence. 154 Reasonable minds can differ as to whether such
costs are significant enough to outweigh the value of religious
liberty. It may depend on the type of job and nature of the
work. 155 It may depend on the quality of the relationships
between the coworkers. It may depend on the degree to which all
coworkers enjoy workplace flexibility to observe their own
holidays, take care of loved ones, or pursue interests that are
important to them at the expense of work hours. And different
people may simply have different levels of tolerance for this kind
of cost being imposed on them. Consequently, we would not be
surprised if different workplaces adopt different policies or norms
on this question or if there are few hard and fast laws that
provide certainty for how to resolve individual cases. 156 Thus,
Mormon religion, states have consistently passed laws prohibiting it that have
survived challenges in court, finding the states interest in preserving monogamy
compelling. See Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (1985) (“Monogamy
is inextricably woven into the fabric of this country’s society . . . . In light of
these fundamental values, the state is justified, by a compelling interest, in
upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous
marriage relationship.”); Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360, 1365 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1990) (“[W]e find that, assuming that Barlow’s practice of polygamy is
constitutionally protected, Arizona’s compelling state interest, as described
below, justifies an infringement upon Barlow’s religiously-motivated conduct.”).
153. Compare Blackburn, 798 P.2d at 1365 (finding preservation of
monogamy a compelling state interest), with Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222 (finding an
interest in school attendance insufficiently strong to overcome the burden on
religion placed on Amish groups).
154. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985)
(“We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with
an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath, violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”). The statute in Thorton
violated the Establishment Clause because it was not secular; the “primary
effect” of a law “must not advance or inhibit religion.” Id. at 708.
155. See id. at 711–12 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Establishment
Clause protection applies only to government action, not that of private
employers).
156. What case law does make clear is that states cannot establish laws
mandating private employers to give time off for one particular religious group,
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rules in different places may appear inconsistent with one
another on their surface, but they are at least consistent to the
extent that they appropriately consider the conflict between the
same underlying values.
What is troubling, however, is that many of our laws seem to
lack any principled balancing at all. That is, there seem to be no
principles at play in the degree to which we permit or limit
religious freedom in individual cases. Sometimes we allow
religious groups to impose significant costs and harms on third
parties; consider, for instance, parents who refuse to vaccinate
their children against deadly diseases for reasons of religion, thus
putting at grave risk both their own children and other children
who cannot be successfully vaccinated. 157 Or consider parents
who are shielded by law from criminal charges when they
withhold necessary medical treatment from their children for
religious reasons. 158 Here, we seem to have embraced an extreme
especially when doing so would substantially burden the private employer. See
id. at 709–10 (“[T]here is no exception when honoring the dictates of Sabbath
observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the
employer’s compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on
other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers.”). However,
states may pass laws of general applicability that affect an entire group that
may contain members of a particular faith. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 606–10 (1961) (finding a Pennsylvania law requiring stores to be closed on
Sundays valid, even though Orthodox Jews claimed that it imposed an undue
burden because the law did not target Jews as a group).
157. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing statutes
mandating vaccination before entry into public schools); see also Michaeleen
Doucleff, How Vaccine Fears Fueled the Resurgence of Preventable Diseases,
NPR (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/01/25/265750719/
how-vaccine-fears-fueled-the-resurgence-of-preventable-diseases (last visited
Jan. 21, 2016) (listing the rise of several preventable diseases such as measles,
whooping cough, and rubella, to name a few) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Alexandra Sifferlin, 4 Diseases Making a Comeback Thanks to
Anti-Vaxxers, TIME (Mar. 17, 2014), http://time.com/27308/4-diseases-making-acomeback-thanks-to-anti-vaxxers/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (noting the rise of
preventable diseases, including measles, in New York City) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1654–55
(arguing that, if posed the question of the constitutionality of universal
vaccination laws, the Court would find that religious individuals would not be
exempt on religious grounds). But see, e.g., State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560,
591 (Wis. 2013) (ruling that prosecuting parents for reckless homicide because
they did not seek medical treatment for their child did not violate the parents’
free exercise rights).
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degree of religious liberty that ignores severe harms to children
and third parties. 159
On the other hand, sometimes statutes or regulations
prohibit the exercise of religious freedom even where there is
little or no harm to anyone. Consider, for example, the plaintiff in
Smith, who wished to use controlled substances as part of his
religious worship ceremonies but was denied even though the
Government could articulate no third party harms, or even harms
to the people who used the drugs in their rituals. 160 Also consider
the plaintiff in Holt v. Hobbs, 161 a prisoner who wished to grow a
beard of one half inch in length to comply with his religious
beliefs but was denied for reasons so transparently baseless that
Supreme Court Justices laughed at them. 162 In these cases and
others, 163 there is apparently no regard for the value of religious
liberty despite the absence of documented harm to any
individual.
In short, the puzzle is not that individual laws appear to
reflect different assessments of how to balance the underlying
principles, but rather that there appear to be no consistent
principles in play. Why?
159. See Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law:
Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 297
(2003) (arguing that members of a pluralistic society should value the rights of
children and their health over the rights of parents who constitute a religious
minority).
160. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (denying
unemployment benefits to individuals who took peyote for religious purposes).
161. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
162. See id. at 859 (finding that a jail’s no-beard policy was not the least
restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest in preventing the
trafficking of contraband).
163. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1675
(discussing how there was clear animosity directed towards particular religious
groups in Tenafly and Lukumi); see also Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (invalidating state laws that suppressed
animal sacrifice); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1116, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2012)
(invalidating a state anti-Sharia law statute); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v.
Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 168 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the borough
violated the Free Exercise Clause by enforcing an ordinance selectively against
Orthodox Jewish conduct); Danika Fears, Developer Ditches Plan for ‘Ground
Zero Mosque,’ N.Y. POST (Apr. 30, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/04/30/developerditches-ground-zero-mosque-to-create-museum-for-islam/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2016) (explaining that a mosque was allowed to be built at Ground Zero
following expressed outrage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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B. Explaining Inconsistency: Religious Groups in the Political
Economy
The apparent absence of consistency in our provision of
religious accommodations can best be explained by basic insights
of a school of political science known as public choice theory. 164
Public choice theory seeks to understand political decisions and
behavior by considering the incentives and self-interest of
stakeholders 165 and policymakers. Public choice theory is
concerned with how even small interest groups are able to
influence and capture the political process. 166
In applying this approach to the question of religious
accommodation, it is useful to think of religious groups as
functioning like any other special interest group in society,
although few religious groups, politicians, or voters choose to
express it this way. 167 Once we orient ourselves in this manner,
we can quite readily understand why the decision to grant or
refuse religious accommodations is often unmoored from
consideration of underlying values and, consequently, yields
inconsistent and incoherent results. 168 We also can model the
circumstances in which the political branches will under-protect
and overprotect religious liberty.
To be clear at the outset, we define “religious interest groups”
broadly, to include everything from those groups that operate
through sophisticated and official lobbying arms, 169 to those that
164. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the
Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 43 (1988) (considering the
social and economic impacts on legislation).
165. See id. at 50 (discussing how powerful interest groups and lobbyists
negatively affect, for example, environmental legislation and lead to ineffective
laws that greatly benefit certain interest groups at the expense of others).
166. See id. at 48 (noting that some of the most politically powerful interest
groups are small in size).
167. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1663
(recognizing that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was heavily lobbied for
by small religious groups).
168. See supra Part II.C (discussing the inconsistency of freedom of religion
case law).
169. See, e.g., Lauren Markoe, Liberal Jewish Group Launches Political
Lobbying Arm, WASH. POST (July 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/on-faith/liberal-jewish-group-launches-political-lobbying-arm/2012/07/25/
gJQAsC8Z9W_story.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (describing how a liberal

TO ACCOMMODATE OR NOT

953

operate—particularly at the local level of governance—on an ad
hoc basis by offering to politicians and lawmakers a coherent and
cohesive audience and, potentially, a reliably supportive voting
bloc. 170 An example of the former is Moral Majority, associated
with the Christian right; 171 a hypothetical example of the latter is
a priest who calls a local politician to explain his church's need
for a no parking zone nearby. 172
The similarities between how religious groups and other
interest groups operate in the policymaking arena are striking
and make the case for why we should analyze the behavior of
religious groups in this manner. Like other interest groups,
religious groups aim to maximize their political influence to
shape public policy in a manner that represents the groups’
interests on issues they care about. 173 A religious interest group
may focus on a single issue, may represent its own interests
broadly, or may participate in a coalition of religious and perhaps
other groups. 174 As with other interest groups, some religious
groups are more organized, powerful, and successful than
Jewish group, Bend the Arc, has initiated lobbying activities) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); About JFNA, JEWISH FED’NS OF N. AM.,
http://jewishfederations.org/about-jfna (last visited June 21, 2015) (stating that
the group lobbies in Washington, D.C. to get $10 billion in public funds for
Jewish communities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1663
(explaining that elected officials have an incentive to work with religious groups
that may provide them with support and votes).
171. See ROBERT C. LIEBMAN & ROBERT VUTHNOW, THE NEW CHRISTIAN
RIGHT: MOBILIZATION AND LEGITIMATION 54–55 (1983) (describing the Moral
Majority as a lobbying arm to influence legislation that “became the byword for
the entire New Christian Right”).
172. For an in-depth discussion of this sort of ad hoc accommodationism in
action, see Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1 at 1635–42
(discussing the experience of a religious community in Memphis, Tennessee that
received favorable treatment from local officials).
173. See Zoë Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative
Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions in Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
133, 135 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions]
(explaining the premise that political actors act in a way to maximize the value
of political outcomes for themselves).
174. See Zoë Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups
in the Legislative Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1045 (2015) [hereinafter
Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows] (discussing the range of religious groups
from well-known church lobbies to lesser-known coalitions and single-issue
groups).
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others. 175 And, like other interest groups, they sometimes have
interests that overlap with those of other interest groups and lead
them to work together in pursuit of common goals. 176
The interests that religious groups pursue may include the
reification into law of religiously motivated stances on broad
public policy issues like abortion, 177 education, 178 same-sex
marriage, 179 drug policy, 180 immigration, 181 criminal law, 182 and
more; and they can also include practical issues of concern
primarily to the religious group itself, such as securing permits to
build a house of worship or obtaining religious exemptions from
laws that may impede specific religious practices. 183
If religious interventions in the political sphere are so
conceptualized, it becomes possible to apply public choice theory
to understand why religious groups sometimes win and
sometimes lose without any apparent principles explaining when

175. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682
(describing how the nature of interest group politics results in stronger religious
groups winning battles against less-organized and less-powerful minority
groups).
176. See id. at 1662 (“[Religious groups] therefore tend to work together to
lobby for religious accommodations, both in the legislature and in the courts.”).
177. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1080
(“Religious interest groups including Priests for Life, Texas Right to Life,
Concerned Women of America for Texas, and Texas Alliance for Life actively
pursue the restriction of the availability of abortions in America.”).
178. See id. at 1065 (discussing the educational goals of the Association of
Jesuit Colleges and Universities).
179. See id. (“The interests of the USCCB advocated for by the OGR include
prohibition of same-sex marriage . . . .”).
180. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1648
(stating that federal legislative exceptions, exemptions, and accommodations
granted to religious institutions include regulation of drug laws).
181. See id. (stating that federal legislative exceptions, exemptions, and
accommodations granted to religious institutions include regulation of
immigration).
182. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 113, at 1446 (discussing the exemption from
gambling laws given to religious groups).
183. See, e.g., Charlie Frago, Clearwater Issues Conditions Scientology Must
Meet to Hold its Events, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.
tampabay.com/news/scientology/clearwater-issues-conditions-scientology-must-meetto-hold-its-events/2151572 (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (stating that the Church of
Scientology had to obtain permits for tents and fences) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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or why. 184 Interest groups compete in the political marketplace
alongside, and sometimes against, other interest groups. 185 In the
modern American political marketplace, good policy and coherent
principles are not the primary determinants of the laws that are
enacted. 186 Rather, like all other rational actors, politicians and
other policymakers respond to incentives. 187 To the extent that
laws enacted represent good policy and coherent principles, they
generally do so because the lawmakers’ incentives are aligned
with those values. 188
At the same time, laws are not decided on the basis of pure
majority preferences. 189 This is because the incentives for
policymakers do not revolve around what the majority prefers,
but rather around the complicated interaction between voter
preferences, the magnitude of those preferences, and the levels of
support—voting, financial, or other—that competing blocs of
voters can deliver. 190 Thus, a small but organized and focused
interest group will often achieve its policymaking goals even
when it externalizes heavy costs on society at large, if the forces
that might object to the policy are disorganized, dispersed
throughout society, and of relatively low priority to potential
184. See Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions, supra note 173, at
135 (“The public choice model supposes that any exemptions and
accommodations for religion enacted by the legislature are the product of the
conflation of religious lobbying efforts and the individual self-interest of
legislators.”).
185. See id. at 145 (explaining that religious firms compete for policy
outcomes).
186. See id. at 148–49 (stating that legislators will enact legislation
primarily for reelection).
187. See id. at 143–44 (discussing that one aspect of the public choice is the
positive theory, which assumes that politicians will act rationally to maximize
their interest).
188. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1100–01
(explaining how legislators are “benefit maximizers” and act based on
incentives).
189. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1663
(“Even in the absence of coordinated lobbying by diverse religious groups,
elected officials may still have political incentives to work with small religious
groups.”).
190. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1076
(describing how politicians respond to religious interest groups that represent
large voting blocs and will help the groups that attract the most votes).
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opponents. 191 In short, a focused minority group often will defeat
a numerically overwhelming but disorganized majority, or a
majority for whom the issue is not a priority. 192 This is because
the focused minority group can reliably deliver votes and other
means of support to a politician or other policymaker, who
therefore responds to the group’s policy preferences; whereas the
amorphous “larger public good” can deliver no support at all. 193
These dynamics amply explain why religious groups have
been so successful in the legislative, executive, and
administrative arenas in obtaining religious accommodations
even when these were not constitutionally required according to
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 194 Indeed, thousands of
statutes and regulations include religious accommodations in
areas ranging from tax law to employment law, criminal law to
regulations governing food preparation, and healthcare law to
zoning ordinances, most of which are not required by the
Constitution. 195 For instance, after the Supreme Court upheld a
military regulation prohibiting service members from wearing
religious garb, Congress voted to generally permit it. 196 Likewise,
when the Court held that the Constitution did not require an
accommodation that would allow Native American Peyotists to
ingest peyote, Congress passed a law permitting it. 197 And, of
191. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1664
(explaining that “a concentrated and focused interest group” is often successful
over a “diffuse opposition that ranks the issue low among their priorities”).
192. See id. at 1667 (stating that the political realities, not just a group’s
headcount, must be considered when assessing a group’s political power).
193. See id. at 1663 (explaining that politicians will be willing to help out
religious minorities who otherwise would not have a voice because the
politicians recognize that certain groups that are minorities are more likely to
be politically active than other groups).
194. See Ryan, supra note 113, at 1445–46 (discussing various areas where
the legislature has carved out religious exceptions, including inspection and tax
law).
195. See id. (“Religious exemptions, in turn, exist in over 2,000 statutes.”).
196. Compare Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (stating
that the Air Force’s dress code policy is related to the military’s interest in
having a uniform dress code, and therefore, the Air Force has not violated the
petitioner’s First Amendment right), with 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2012) (explaining
that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while
wearing the uniform of the member’s armed force” except when the apparel
would interfere with the member’s ability to perform his duties).
197. Compare Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (“But to say
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course, after the Supreme Court ruled in Smith that neutral,
generally applicable laws need not include exceptions and
accommodations for religious minority groups, Congress and
several state legislatures responded by enacting laws like RFRA
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalize Persons Act
(RLUIPA) to establish minority religious rights that would be
free from legislative and administrative incursions that might be
supported by the majority. 198 In each of these cases, religious
interest groups organized focused campaigns to achieve their
goals and faced little opposition, either because other interest
groups actively supported the accommodation or simply had no
organizing interest in fighting it. 199
These same dynamics also explain why even small minority
religious groups are sometimes able to obtain benefits that inflict
harm on third parties. 200 Only a small minority of the population
supports immunization exemptions on the basis of religion or
conscience, 201 but this minority is quite focused and motivated. 202
On the other hand, the lobbies supporting compulsory
immunization, consisting principally of various medical
organizations, are concerned with multiple issues and are not as

that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that
it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.”), with 42
U.S.C. § 1996a (2012) (overruling the decision in Smith and making it illegal to
prohibit the use of peyote for religious purposes).
198. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994)), invalidated by
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012)).
199. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1645
(explaining that the majority effectively agreed to give the minority special
rights when the RFRA was passed).
200. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination
Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 848
(2001–2002) (discussing how the minority view has been effective in protesting
mandatory vaccinations, despite the harm that can be caused by allowing some
people to avoid being vaccinated).
201. See id. (describing the minority anti-vaccinationist sentiment).
202. See id. (“Antivaccinationist sentiment largely remained the view of a
vocal minority, although the fervor with which it was expressed remained
influential.”).
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focused. 203 While vaccination exemptions expose everyone in
society to increased risks, most people are not motivated enough,
except, perhaps, in the wake of a well-publicized medical crisis, to
organize in opposition. 204 The same is true for laws that provide
religious exceptions to medical neglect laws; such laws may be
bad for children and society at large, but there are few votes to be
won by politicians for fighting them. 205
On the other hand, religious interest groups can lose in the
political marketplace as well, and the basic dynamics we have
described operate here as well. 206 A religious interest group will
fail to achieve its goals in the political arena where (1) a broad
majority becomes focused on defeating it; 207 or (2) the issue puts
the religious interest group in competition with another, more
powerful interest group. 208 In addition, the religious interest
group may also lose to an evenly matched or smaller competing
interest group that is able to exert more influence over
policymakers then in power. 209
203. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682
(explaining that groups that are more organized are more likely to be successful
in achieving their goals, even if they are advocating the minority view).
204. See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 200, at 874 (“Virtually all states also
grant religious exemptions for persons who have sincere religious beliefs in
opposition to immunization.”).
205. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1654–55
(discussing medical neglect laws and that “there has been too much
majoritarianism favoring religious liberty claims”).
206. See id. at 1655–56 (“[E]ven when the courts have held back in these
areas, rightly recognizing the competing nature of some public interests that
might trump free exercise concerns, political decisionmakers have pushed
forward nonetheless—effectively protecting religious autonomy even at the
expense of countervailing public health and safety interests.”).
207. See id. at 1664–65 (offering examples of majority groups focusing on
preventing religious accommodation).
208. See id. at 1667 (discussing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and
how, “in the political debates that produced the laws in question, the lobbying
power of religious liberty groups was diminished, and the lobbying power that
remained was met and exceeded by the lobbying power of the opposing side”).
209. See, e.g., Peter Baker, President Calls for a Ban on Job Bias Against
Gays, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/us/
politics/obama-job-discrimination-gays-executive-order.html (last visited Dec.
20, 2015) (stating that President Obama faced heavy pressure from
organizations representing gays—a Democratic core constituency—before
rejecting requests by religious groups to exempt them from the executive order
prohibiting discrimination against gays) (on file with the Washington and Lee
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At times, the majority may not tolerate a religious group’s
preferences because the cost on involved individuals or on third
parties is too great, and the religious principles involved seem too
outrageous to those outside the religion. 210 Presumably, this is
why, no matter how focused and organized a religious interest
group is, society will never tolerate sumptuary laws or laws that
permit ritual murder. 211 Often, though, there are simply basic
disagreements between the various groups as to the relative
values underlying the policy being debated. 212 A religious interest
group may wish to limit women’s ability to obtain abortions,
whereas a competing women’s rights interest group may oppose
such limitations. 213 Or a religious interest group may favor more
liberal immigration laws, 214 whereas a competing labor union
may favor more restrictive immigration laws. 215 However strong
the disagreement in these examples, each side is comprehensible
to the other, in contrast to the case with permitting ritual
murder. 216 In such cases the relative size and power of the
Law Review).
210. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1674
(“Laws that prohibit murder are not driven by a desire to harm religious groups
that wish to practice human sacrifice but by a widely shared communal belief
that the taking of a human life (absent special circumstances) is a moral and
ethical evil and harms the interests of society.”).
211. See id. (discussing the limits that are placed on religious exemptions for
minority groups).
212. See id. at 1666 (“Rather, there are simply issues on which different
groups hold opposing views very strongly. Such conflicts may present a
zero-sum equation in which either the religious liberty interest or the opposing
equality interest can prevail, but not both.”).
213. See id. at 1666–68 (discussing interest group lobbying in the Hobby
Lobby case).
214. See Michael Lipka, Catholics, Other Christians Support Immigration
Reform, But Say Faith Plays Small Role, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/01/catholics-other-christianssupport-immigration-reform-but-say-faith-plays-small-role/ (last visited Dec. 20,
2015) (describing religious groups of a number of different faiths that are
supporting immigration reform and many are asking President Obama to use
his power as President to limit deportation of immigrants who are already in the
United States) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
215. See Developments in the Law Immigration: Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1440 (1983) (“Labor unions, fearing that
undocumented aliens displace United States workers, have pressed for greater
restrictions . . . .”).
216. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1680–81

960

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016)

interest groups, their influence over the policymakers then in
power, and the policymakers’ own personal beliefs, commitments,
and assessment of the political risks will determine which side
wins. 217
Sometimes a religious group will lose to the majority in the
political sphere because of the majority’s base animus toward
that group, even where the religious group’s practices impose no
clear harm on the broader society. 218 The Lukumi case is such an
example. 219 There, the majority of the citizens in the City of
Hialeah were so disgusted by the Santería practice of animal
sacrifice—and perhaps by Santería in general—that they passed
a law prohibiting animal sacrifice but permitting all manner of
animal killing that those outside Santería might choose to engage
in. 220 Likewise, in Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, 221 the majority of the
citizens were so opposed to the establishment of a vibrant
Orthodox Jewish community in their town that they enforced a
neutral law in a blatantly discriminatory manner to prevent it. 222
Other cases based in animus may include broad efforts to prohibit
Muslims from building houses of worship and attempts to pass
(explaining that often groups on both sides of an issue are sophisticated parties
who are able to negotiate with one another).
217. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1100–01
(explaining how groups that represent the minority opinion are able to enact
changes by using the political process to their advantage).
218. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1664
(“First, when a religious practice or group is perceived to challenge or threaten
the majority’s cultural norms, all bets are off. In these conditions, the opposition
becomes focused and coordinated enough to defeat the religious interest
promoted by the minority.”).
219. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 526–30 (1993) (explaining how in response to the establishment of a
Santeria church, the city council passed a law prohibiting the unlawful killing of
animals and making it illegal for the church to carry out part of their religious
practices of sacrificing animals).
220. See id. at 526–28 (“The prospect of a Santería church in their midst was
distressing to many members of the Hialeah community, and the announcement
of the plans to open a Santeria church in Hialeah prompted the city council to
hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.”).
221. 309 F.3d 144 (3d. Cir. 2002).
222. See id. at 151–52 (explaining that, although the city ordinance
preventing citizens from advertising or placing signs on utility poles or trees in
the city applied to all citizens equally, in practice this ordinance was not applied
to all people equally).
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laws that ban Sharia law, even to arbitrate private
agreements. 223 Ultimately, the courts may strike down such
discriminatory laws as unconstitutional, 224 but the point is that
group animus can sometimes be sufficient to mobilize and focus
opponents and defeat a religious interest group through the
elected branches even where the principle of pluralism ought to
be sustained. 225
In short, religious groups operate in the political marketplace
like other interest groups. 226 As such, whether they win or lose on
a particular political issue is related less to a principled balancing
of the competing underlying values than it is to the political
dynamics in play. 227
C. The Problems with Leaving Accommodations to Politics
The absence of a principled approach to these issues is deeply
troubling. 228 It is a basic principle of ethics as well as law that
like things should be treated alike, 229 and so we should always be
223. See Fears, supra note 163 (explaining that a mosque was allowed to be
built at Ground Zero following expressed outrage); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d
1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012) (invalidating a state anti-Sharia law).
224. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524 (“The challenged laws had an
impermissible object; and in all events the principle of general applicability was
violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws were pursued
only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.”); Tenafly, 309 F.3d
at 151 (upholding the injunction that the lower court ordered because the law
was facially neutral); Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132 (applying a heightened level of
review to uphold the lowers court injunction).
225. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1664
(discussing how if the minority opinion conflicts with the majorities view point,
the majority will use its power to ensure the minority does not prevail).
226. See id. (discussing how the political process plays a vital role in
determining which interest group is able to have its voice heard).
227. See id. at 1667 (“[C]areful attention to the political realities in which
public officials and religious groups operate illuminates why political majorities
so often accommodate religious beliefs and practices, even where the courts do
not require them to.”).
228. See Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV.
1035, 1039 (2013) [hereinafter Levin, Reliance Approach] (explaining why
reliance on precedent is concerning and is being used too often).
229. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK V 71 (W. D. Ross trans., 1999);
see H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 622–24 (1958) (“The connection between law and moral standards and
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bothered by gross inconsistencies in the law. We can ask why,
given that the vast majority of our laws are produced through the
very same political dynamic as we have identified in this context,
and therefore display similar inconsistencies and pathologies
throughout the law, we should be especially wary of this dynamic
in the context of religious accommodationism. 230 Indeed, this
formal equality principle is hardly a feature of our system, for the
law does, indeed must, tolerate all kinds of inconsistencies. 231
There are perhaps four possible answers to this question,
only one of which we find persuasive. 232 First, these political
dynamics might be so corrosive and pathological that the
lawmaking process as a whole should be reordered in a way to
reflect greater consistency and principle in the law. 233 In other
words, gross inconsistency is not only, or even especially, a
problem in the context of religious accommodation; this is simply
the context in which we happen to be writing. 234 We need not
take sides on this position because it is outside the scope of our
project.
Second, the context of religious accommodation might
warrant special scrutiny because the concerns we have identified
take on special force where the rights or interests of small and
principles of justice is therefore as little arbitrary and as ‘necessary’ as the
connection between law and sanctions . . . .”).
230. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655
(explaining how the courts have not “adequately delineated the boundary
between permissible religious accommodations and impermissible ones”).
231. See Levin, Reliance Approach, supra note 228, at 1039 (discussing the
way that the courts apply precedent often results in inconsistent outcomes and
the way that precedent is applied should be reevaluated).
232. See id. at 1044 (explaining that the debate about precedent is not a new
debate and that there have been several theories on the issue); David L.
Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection,
86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 929 (2008) (“In recent years, there has been a surprising
outpouring of academic literature on the proper role of precedent in
constitutional cases.”).
233. See Shapiro, supra note 232, at 935 (explaining that some scholars
believe that the law should be applied strictly adhering to the constitution and
precedent).
234. See Drew C. Ensign, Note, The Impact of Liberty on Stare Decisis: The
Rehnquist Court from Casey to Lawrence, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2006)
(“At the Supreme Court level, it generally requires that the Court adhere to its
prior resolution of a particular issue, even if a majority of the Court believes
that the prior decision is flawed.”).
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marginalized religious minority groups, children, and unaware
third parties are at stake and are at the mercy of the whims and
power dynamics of the political marketplace. 235 The competing
rights and interests of both sides in these cases—disfavored
religious minority groups on the one hand and children and the
silent public on the other—are already underrepresented and
under-protected in the political arena, 236 and we should aim to do
better than merely accept that the political marketplace will
decide the fate of such groups according to its internal political
dynamics rather than by reference to underlying values. This
views the problems with our political system through an
Ely-esque lens 237 and suggests that there are certain contexts in
which the political system alone, given its pathologies, cannot be
left to operate as it normally does. To be clear, this merely
narrows the universe of cases in which we should reject “politics
as usual”—it does not limit these cases to the religious context
because there are many other underrepresented groups who
cannot get a fair shake in the political system. 238 For our part, we
agree with this critique as an ethical matter—legislators should
do better by bringing a principled approach to these questions—
but we cannot say that the Constitution demands this approach.
A third possible response is that religion is indeed special
and deserving of special protection under the Constitution. 239
Proponents of this approach are those who believe the Supreme
235. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655–56
(explaining how precedent differs when religion is at issue because of the
various issues that are presented with religion issues before the courts).
236. See id. (“[R]ecognizing the competing nature of some public interests
that might trump free exercise concerns, political decision makers have pushed
forward nonetheless—effectively protecting religious autonomy even at the
expense of countervailing public health and safety interest.”).
237. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (explaining John Ely’s view that the courts should strive
to protect both the majority position while also guarding the minorities’ rights).
238. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1623–24
(noting that the minority position is not always protected by the political
process).
239. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 20, at 688–89
(“Accommodations of religion are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not for the purpose of promoting the government’s own
favored form of religion, but of allowing individuals and groups to exercise their
religion—whatever it may be—without hindrance.”).
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Court got Smith wrong. 240 They would maintain that the
unpredictable and unprincipled political process that sometimes
produces too little accommodation cannot be trusted to
adequately protect the constitutional value of religious free
exercise. 241 But our project is not to re-litigate the merits of
Smith, and so we do not rest on this justification either. Also, it is
critical to note that this approach would only touch one side of
the equation: under-accommodation of religious practices would
be of constitutional concern, but over-accommodation as a result
of the political economy dynamic we have identified would be
acceptable. 242 We, in contrast, are bothered by both. Furthermore,
Smith is unlikely to be reversed in the near to intermediate term,
and a serious discussion of religious accommodations must accept
a legal regime in which Smith is good law. 243
Instead, we offer a fourth reason that we should demand
more than “politics as usual” in the context of religious
accommodations that potentially harm children or third parties:
both sides of the equation implicate constitutional values. On the
one hand, the Free Exercise Clause embodies a respect for
religious liberty and, at the very least, demands that individuals
and groups not be prevented from practicing their religious
obligations as a result of bias, animus, or stereotyping on the part
of lawmakers and officials. 244 Further, to the degree that different
240. See Marc O. DeGirolami, Predictably Unpredictable: Thoughts on the
Free Exercise Clause, CTR FOR L. & RELIGION FOR. (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://clrforum.org/2013/03/08/predictably-unpredictable-thoughts-on-the-freeexercise-clause/ (last visited on Dec. 23, 2015) (explaining how Smith has
produced an unpredictable outcome that the opinion aimed to eliminate) (on file
with Washington and Lee Law Review).
241. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1621–22
(noting that Douglas Laycock, a well-known scholar and advocate of religious
freedom, has warned that Smith will produce an outcome that will lead the
minority religious groups not being properly represented).
242. See id. at 1652–56 (describing how majoritarian institutions have
sometimes been more likely to over-accommodate minority religious groups,
more than is required by the courts and the Constitution).
243. See DeGirolami, supra note 240 (noting that the Smith decision has
been followed).
244. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”); Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993) (“We also find significant evidence of the ordinances’
improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more
religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends.”); Tenafly Eruv
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religious groups may receive different treatment from
legislatures as a result of the political power of the groups,
constitutional questions also arise. 245
On the other hand, religious accommodations that impose
harms to children and third parties raise substantial questions
under the Establishment Clause. 246 After all, in permitting a
religious practice that harms others who do not choose to subject
themselves to the same religious strictures, the state is in effect
subjecting some of its citizens to the rule of those favored
religions to which those citizens belong. 247 These competing
constitutional values demand careful and principled balancing
and consistent resolution on the part of policymakers and judges
confronting these cases. 248 It is not enough to say, “leave it to
politics as usual.” 249

Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 168 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Borough’s
selective, discretionary application of Ordinance 691 against the lechis violates
the neutrality principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police . . . .”); Levin,
Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1665 (“[T]he city of Hialeah
enacted a facially neutral ordinance against animal sacrifice that was
nevertheless clearly directed at . . . adherents of Santeria. Citizens were free to
kill animals for reasons other than ceremonial sacrifice, and the record was rife
with evidence of animus towards practitioners of Santeria.”).
245. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418, 432–34 (2006) (discussing the RFRA’s exception for peyote and
comparing it to hoasca).
246. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655
(discussing the line of cases interpreting the Establishment Clause to limit the
accommodation of religious practices that harm third parties).
247. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (“This Court has long
recognized
that
the
government
may . . . accommodate
religious
practices . . . without violating the Establishment Clause.” (quoting Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987))). See
generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions
from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of
Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 344–49 (2014) (discussing religious
exemptions and their effects on third parties).
248. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1682
(explaining that there are times when the court is unable to properly balance
the competing interests at issue).
249. See id. at 1683 (“Thus, although the majoritarian branches and courts
may both make poor decisions on such questions, the majoritarian branches
enjoy two critical advantages over courts: (a) they can revisit policy choices at
will; and (b) they have some majoritarian legitimacy.”).
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IV. Balancing Religious Liberty Against Protection of Children
and Third Parties: A Proposed Test
This Part offers and describes a principled test that balances
the competing interests in these cases according to the yin and
yang of the First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. 250 It first lays out the test, then explains it and unpacks
its individual provisions, and finally demonstrates how the test
would apply in a variety of cases, in some cases tracking current
laws and in others requiring different results. 251
A. The Test252
1. BASES FOR POSSIBLE RESTRICTION: A religious
practice related to the needs of its members with regard to
health and safety may be restricted if it creates a deleterious
effect in one or both of the following two ways: 253

250. See id. at 1655–56 (noting the presence of case law favoring one
religious group over another; however, the line that courts use to make this
determination is unclear).
251. Infra Parts IV.A–C.
252. The test is modified from previous iterations described in Allan J.
Jacobs, The Ethics of Circumcision of Male Infants, 15 ISRAEL MED. ASS’N. J. 60
(2013) and Allan J. Jacobs & Kavita Shah Arora, Ritual Male Infant
Circumcision and Human Rights, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 30 (2015). Prior versions
were written from a general ethics perspective; this version is adapted to be
applicable to American constitutional law. It has been modified in three
important respects. First, the content of the restrictions (first prong) has been
disaggregated from the constraints (second and third prongs). Second, this
iteration of the test is phrased as determining what government may restrict;
other iterations were phrased in terms of what government ought to permit.
Finally, the test stipulates circumstances in which government is not only
permitted, but also expected to restrict certain practices. This iteration was
crafted to conform with the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and to guide lawmakers bound by those clauses. The connection
between the test and the religion clauses will be discussed infra. While
affirming that government has a responsibility to protect vulnerable people
against severe injuries, the authors acknowledge that other societies may find a
different balance between the need for such protection and the demands of faith.
This is particularly true in States with established religions that contain a
strong praxis component.
253. See infra notes 406–411 (discussing the tension surrounding the debate
of infant circumcision and whether this practice, which is a required practice for
certain religions, could also be a human rights violation).
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a. Direct effects: The practice affects children and other
vulnerable members of the religious group 254 (i) by creating a
substantial chance of death or major disruption of a
physiological function or (ii) by creating other objectively
severe harmful effects, such as malnutrition or major
psychological morbidity. 255 If the effect is severe, the
government has a constitutional obligation to limit the
practice. 256 Enforcing this obligation is generally the province
of legislatures rather than courts, although in extraordinary
cases it may be appropriate for courts to enforce this provision.
b. Indirect effects: The practice creates unreasonable
burdens for (i) society as a whole or (ii) members of society
outside the religious group. If the effects are severe, the
government has a constitutional obligation to limit the
practice. Enforcing this obligation is generally the province of
legislatures rather than courts, although in extraordinary
cases it may be appropriate for courts to enforce this provision.
2. LIKELIHOOD OF EFFECT: In order to constitute a
basis for restricting a religious practice, the burdens, costs,
risks, or harms must be actual, rather than merely
hypothetical, and must not be unlikely.
3. MAGNITUDE OF EFFECT: Notwithstanding the
foregoing provisions, if society tolerates harms from
comparable mainstream practices that impose harms of a
similar magnitude to the harms posed by the religious practice
at issue, then it should not restrict that religious practice.
Conversely, if a mainstream practice that imposes severe
harms is forbidden, then a comparable religious practice that
imposes harms of a similar magnitude should likewise not be
tolerated. Legislatures should be mindful of this provision
when considering religious accommodations, and courts should
be active in enforcing it.

254. Henceforth collectively denoted as “children” for stylistic reasons.
255. See Jacobs & Arora, supra note 252, at 31–32 (noting that the risks
associated with infant circumcision are minimal; critics argue, however, that
this irreversible procedure takes away an important decision for a person to
make on his own).
256. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1657
(discussing how religiously diverse the United States is and how this has
contributed to a high level of religious tolerance in the United States).
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B. Explaining the Test
1. The Thrust of the Test and Its Audience

This test is intended to (1) impose consistency on the
accommodation and non-accommodation of religious practices
that may harm children and third parties; (2) to embody and
reflect the constitutional values at stake; and (3) to provide
appropriate guidelines for legislators and other officials, judges,
medical practitioners, and other professionals who are confronted
with the question of whether to participate in or enable religious
practices at the request of their patients.
The Bases for Possible Restriction prong is designed to
balance the interests of religious groups and individuals against
those of in-group children and members of society at large who
may be harmed by religious practices. It provides a default rule
that religious practices should be respected unless they unduly
interfere with the real and measurable interests of children
within the religion and others outside the religious group. This
embodies a healthy respect for religious liberty and the
accommodationist commitments of a liberal society but also
affirms an important societal duty to protect children and third
parties from harms imposed upon them by others. This part of
the test also provides that where the harms to children or third
parties are sufficiently severe, the government has an obligation
to prevent the conduct, because of the Establishment Clause
concerns identified in Part III.C. 257 In general, it is up to
legislators and other policymakers, rather than courts, to assess
risks of harm. However, as we discuss below, 258 in extraordinary
circumstances courts may be required to act in order to prevent
the harm. This should be the case only where the risk of harm
created by a practice is obvious to all and especially severe. In
many (and perhaps most) such cases, though, courts will not have
to undertake independent analysis of the magnitude of the risk
and its tolerability because they may apply the Magnitude prong
as a lodestar.
257. See supra Part III.C (discussing the issues created by not remedying
the lack of uniformity with how religious accommodations are addressed).
258. See infra Part IV.C (discussing examples of how the test will be applied
to required religious practices that cause harm).
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The Likelihood prong is designed to prevent abuse of the
Bases for Possible Restriction by foreclosing pretextual action
against religious practices as a result of supposed harms that
may be hypothetical, slight, rare, or even nonexistent. As with
the first prong of the test, this prong is primarily for legislators
and other policymakers to enforce. In cases where those
policymakers have obviously used a minimal risk of harm as a
pretext to target religious practices, courts may intercede. Here
again, though, courts will often have the benefit of the Magnitude
prong to serve as their guidepost.
The Magnitude prong of the test also serves as a limitation
on the Bases for Possible Restriction. Effectively, it captures the
Supreme Court’s admonition in Lukumi that society may not
target religious practices for censure when it permits comparable
mainstream
practices,
thus
enforcing
Free
Exercise
boundaries. 259 In so doing, this limitation, in concert with the rest
of the test, also serves four other important functions, which we
introduce here because they help to explain the thrust and basic
functions of the test.
First, the test, especially the Magnitude prong, offers a
guideline for sorting through the Establishment Clause problem
introduced supra. 260 The Establishment Clause prohibits some
third-party harms from being imposed by religious
accommodations but permits others. 261 Neither the courts nor
legal scholars have offered much guidance for where the
demarcating line is. 262 The Magnitude prong suggests that where
society has chosen to permit mainstream practices that are
comparable to the religious conduct in question and that impose
similar harms, the Establishment Clause is not violated. In other
words, it does not constitute religious oppression or coercion for
259. See Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 536
(1993) (finding that the ordinance targets religious animal sacrifice but allows
other types of animal killings).
260. See supra Part III.C (explaining why it is problematic that religious
accommodations are not treated uniformly).
261. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655 (“The
Court has never adequately delineated the boundary between permissible
religious accommodations and impermissible ones.”).
262. For example, scholars have suggested that there is an Establishment
Clause problem where the third-party harm is “significant” or “substantial,” but
these terms do little to offer practical guidance to courts.
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society to allow a religious practice that imposes the same kind of
harm that society has generally chosen to tolerate for itself for
other reasons. This evokes symmetry between the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Second, the test protects Free Exercise interests. The
Likelihood prong prevents restriction of religious practices on
frivolous grounds, and the Magnitude prong, as noted, tracks
Lukumi, 263 in precluding pretextual laws that functionally, but
not explicitly, single out religious practices for restriction. Third,
the test, taken as a whole, responds to the concerns raised by the
troubling political economy dynamics discussed above. 264 On the
one hand, the Bases for Possible Restriction provide that religious
groups cannot use their relative lobbying power in the political
branches to enjoy the benefits of religious freedom while imposing
the costs on the dispersed and unrepresented minority. On the
other hand, the Likelihood and Magnitude prongs prevent the
reverse dynamic, by prohibiting other groups—whatever their
motivation—from exploiting their relative political power by
granting themselves freedoms that they would not extend to
religious minorities.
Finally, the test is meant to be applied by decision makers in
a variety of contexts. Legislators and other officials can use it to
decide prospectively how to treat a particular religious practice.
Judges can use it as a baseline reference for interpreting and
applying unclear legislative and administrative guidance, 265 and
also as a tool for making constitutional determinations as to
whether the legal treatment of a religious practice violates the
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. Medical
clinicians, educators, and other practitioners who do not
263. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 545–46 (“We conclude, in sum, that each of
Hialeah’s ordinances pursues the city’s governmental interests only against
conduct motivated by religious belief. The ordinances ‘have every appearance of
a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but
not upon itself.’” (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))).
264. See supra Part III (discussing why the way religious accommodations
are granted in the United States is troubling).
265. For example, “best interests of the child,” open-textured statutory
provisions like RFRA, and cases related to the provision of medical treatment
over parents’ objections. See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text
(discussing the protection given to religious groups under RFRA).
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formulate laws can look to the test for guidance as to whether
they should accede to a patient’s or client’s request that they
participate in a particular religious practice. 266 As we have
already noted, the test is flexible enough that it may apply
differently in each of these different contexts due to the different
institutional strengths and weaknesses of each type of decision
maker.
2. Unpacking the Test: Explanations and Definitions
a. Identifying a “Religious Practice”
As used in the test, a “religious practice” can be either an
affirmative act or an affirmative decision to refrain from an act.
Religious education 267 and circumcision268 are examples of
affirmative acts that can constitute religious practices and
support religious identity. Refusal of blood transfusion, 269
conscientious objection to military service, 270 and abstinence from
specific food products 271 are examples of affirmative
266. For example, non-vaccination or hiring a person who will not dispense
contraception. See generally Adam Sonfield, Rights vs. Responsibilities:
Professional Standards and Provider Refusals, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 2005),
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/gr080307.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2016) (“[P]olicymakers have engaged for decades in an ever-broadening debate
over whether and in what circumstances individuals or institutions involved in
the provision of health care or related services can refuse to provide services or
information on moral or religious grounds.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
267. See generally Steven M. Cohen, The Impact of Varieties of Jewish
Education upon Jewish Identity: An Inter-Generational Perspective, 16
CONTEMP. JEWRY 1 (1995) (discussing how education has allowed the Jewish
faith to remain culturally distinct).
268. See generally Joseph Mazor, The Child’s Interests and the Case for the
Permissibility of Male Infant Circumcision, 39 J. MED ETHICS 421, 426–27 (2013)
(discussing the religious practice of circumcision of male children).
269. See Donald T. Ridley, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Refusal of Blood: Obedience
to Scripture and Religious Conscience, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 469, 469–70 (1999)
(explaining the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ objection to blood transfusion).
270. See Alfred J. Sciarrino & Kenneth L. Deutsch, Conscientious Objection
to War: Heroes to Human Shields, 18 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 59, 80–81 (2003)
(documenting that Quakers do not serve in the military).
271. See Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 953
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renunciations that also can be central to religious identity. 272
Endogamy 273 and refusal to abandon religion-specific garb in
certain public areas 274 display aspects of each. In all these cases,
the religious person does something or refrains from doing
something because of religious claims. 275 Thus, religious practices
go well beyond beliefs and ceremonies. 276
b. Identifying a “Religious Group”
Typically, religious groups that are subject to our proposed
test will be minority religious groups, for three reasons. First,
every religious group in the United States constitutes a minority
group. 277 That is, there is no single religious sect that counts as
adherents more than 50% of the population. 278 Second, to the
extent that mainstream Christianity places demands on religious
(1997) (explaining the Jewish dietary practices and which foods the Jewish laws
prohibit).
272. See Lanse Minkler & Metin Cosgel, Religious Identity and
Consumption 5 (Univ. of Conn. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 5, 2004) (“A
religious commitment is often at the core of an individual’s sense of identity.”),
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1118&context=econ
_wpapers.
273. See M. Christian Green, Religion, Family Law, and Recognition of
Identity in Nigeria, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 945, 957–58 (2011) (documenting the
rates of religious endogamy in different countries); Farrah Ahmed, Personal
Autonomy and the Option of Religious Law, 24 INT. J.L., POL’Y & FAM. 222, 225
(2010) (discussing issues involved with the religious forms of marriage).
274. See Roberta Medda-Windischer, The Contribution of the European
Court of Human Rights to the Accommodation of Contemporary Religious
Diversity, 9 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 453, 460 (2010) (“For instance, what is
likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a particular religious persuasion
will vary significantly from time to time and from place to place, especially in an
era characterised by an ever growing array of faiths and denominations.”).
275. See Mazor, supra note 268, at 421 (discussing the role that circumcision
plays in the Jewish faith).
276. See id. (exploring the freedom-of-choice concerns that are raised by the
Jewish practice of infant circumcision).
277. See Religious Landscape Study, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.
pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (showing
that no sect within a religious group in the United States constitutes more than
50% of the population) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
278. See id. (listing the percentages of the different religious groups in the
United States).
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practices, they tend to be compatible with mainstream behavior,
and are therefore likely to be untroubling to most. For example,
American laws against selling horse meat 279 or nudity280 are
unlikely to trouble many people. However, immigrants from a
nation in Central Asia where consumption of equine meat and
dairy products is a major part of the diet 281 might be bothered by
the unavailability of their accustomed dishes. Third, to the extent
that popular and mainstream religious groups do face barriers to
performing religious practices, they are unlikely to conflict often
with state law or to be perceived by the state as being inherently
dangerous. After all, mainstream practice typically corresponds
with social acceptability. 282
For these reasons, the test will most often apply to the
practices of insular groups that operate outside of, or on the
margins of, the broader society. Chasidic 283 Jews, for example,
attempt to isolate themselves from the larger society and observe
a markedly different lifestyle from most Americans. 284 Chasidim
“lead lives of intense piety,” 285 attempting to follow and exceed
279. See Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 557–59 (7th Cir. 2007)
(upholding law that banned the slaughter of horse meat for human
consumption).
280. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. 277, 296–97 (upholding city
ordinance that banned nudity in public places).
281. See Kazakh National Cuisine, VISIT KAZAKHSTAN, http://visit
kazakhstan.kz/en/about/80/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (describing a traditional
Kazakh dish made out of horse meat) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law
Review).
282. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1647
(explaining that mainstream religions rarely need accommodations because
their interests are usually reflected in the law).
283. Chasidut ( )חסידותis a Hebrew word that incorporates piety and
kindness. It, or Chasidism (its English equivalent), also applies to a movement
in traditional Judaism. A Jew who follows Chasidism is called a Chasid (plural,
Chasidim). The “Ch” in these words is guttural not found in English,
pronounced like the Spanish “j.”
284. See Judith Lynn Failer, The Draw and Drawbacks of Religious
Enclaves in a Constitutional Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in Kiryas Joel,
72 IND. L.J. 383, 387 (1997) (“[E]ven though Jewish law does not require Jews to
live apart from non-Jews or to eschew modern conveniences, many Hasidic Jews
assume the responsibilities of these additional requirements in order to ensure
that they are living as holy a life as they can.”).
285. See id. at 386–87 (citations omitted) (explaining that Orthodox Jews
believe that if they do not follow all Jewish laws then they will face unfavorable
consequences).

974

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016)

the demands of Jewish orthodoxy. 286 Their communities are led
by a rebbe 287 believed to have special awareness of God. 288
Acceptable food and clothing choices are narrow. 289 Marriages are
endogamous and arranged. 290 Chasidim consult the rebbe before
they “marry, choose an occupation, settle in a neighborhood or
undergo surgery or infertility treatments,” 291 and before other
important personal decisions. 292 Religious dictates, as interpreted
by the rebbe in each individual case, would even determine when
they would report a crime to the authorities. 293 As M. Herbert
Danziger says, “Traditionalists [such as Chasidim] allow their
leaders authority in political and personal matters, and the
leadership attempts to exercise authority beyond the specifics of
halakhah [Jewish law].” 294 Chasidic Jews are at an extreme in
286. See id. at 387 (explaining that Orthodox Jews live their lives in
isolation, to ensure that they do not accidentally break any Jewish laws).
287. Yiddish רבי, pronounced “reb’-buh;” often translated as “grand rabbi.”
288. See Failer, supra note 284, at 387–88 (explaining the influential role
the Rebbe plays in the Jewish religion).
289. See id. at 387 (“In his excellent study of Hasidic Jews, Jerome R. Mintz
notes, ‘[t]o protect the community from contaminating offenses, the Hasidim
post additional strictures as a protective buffer to the law. These may be
precepts regarding clothing, customs, diet, and the separation of the sexes.’”
(citation omitted)).
290. See Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and the Tragedy of Sexual Abuse
of Children—The Dilemma Within the Orthodox Jewish Community, 13
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 281, 330–31 (2012) (discussing the process of
becoming married under Jewish law).
291. See Joseph Berger, Are Liberal Jewish Voters a Thing of the Past?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/sunday-review/areliberal-jewish-voters-athing-of-the-past.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (“Yet
Hasidim need to be better understood, not just because of their numbers but
also because of their tendency to vote in blocs according to the wishes of a sect’s
grand rabbi, who often makes his choices based on pragmatic rather than
ideological reasons.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
292. See Failer, supra note 284, at 387–88 (explaining the influence of the
Rebbe in the Jewish religion and how Jews make important life decisions in
accordance with the views of the Rebbe).
293. See Resnicoff, supra note 290, at 355 (discussing the likelihood of
Orthodox Jews consulting their rabbinic authority as opposed to non-Orthodox
Jews).
294. See M. HERBERT DANZGER, RETURNING TO TRADITION: THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIVAL OF ORTHODOX JUDAISM 164 (Yale Univ. Press, 1989)
(explaining that traditionalists seek guidance for their leader for matters
beyond Jewish law but that modernists limit the guidance they receive from
their leader to matters specific to Jewish Law).
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religious separation from society in the United States, though
they are not alone. 295 Protestant communities such as the Amish
and Hutterites, as well as Catholic monastic communities, are
comparably isolated by dress and behavior from the general
population. 296
That said, some conflicts between more integrated religious
groups and state law do arise. 297 Many doxis-oriented
mainstream religious groups that are well integrated into the
broader society impose at least some prohibitions on conduct. 298
For example, some mainstream Christian faiths prohibit
abortion, and upholding this prohibition may, in some cases,
conflict with some state-imposed obligations. 299 Quakers will not
swear oaths or fight in the armed forces, 300 while Christian
Scientists prefer not to use medical care; 301 but most are
otherwise undistinguishable from their neighbors. Reform Jews
are also well integrated, 302 placing few unique demands on their
295. See Gabriel Rauterberg, The Treatment of Isolationist Minorities, 22
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105, 112 (2010) (“In North America today, there are
religious minorities that withdraw from the dominant society and seek to create
radically different ways of life.”).
296. See id. at 112–20 (discussing the different cultures and legal treatment
of the Hutterites and Amish).
297. See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and
the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1793, 1814–15 (2006) (“And Quakers were unwilling to conscript others
while exempting themselves; the Franklin-drafted preamble recited that such a
law would be ‘inconsistent and partial,’ and many Quaker legislators appear to
have believed that voting to conscript anyone would violate their conscience.”).
298. See Deborah Abbott & Stephen Gottschalk, The Christian Science
Tradition: Religious Beliefs and Healthcare Decisions, PARK RIDGE CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF HEALTH, FAITH & ETHICS 1–3 (2002), http://www.che.org/members/
ethics/docs/1276/Christian%20Science.pdf (discussing the healing process that
Christian Scientists believe in).
299. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014)
(“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates
RFRA.”).
300. See Laycock, supra note 297, at 1803 (discussing the Quakers’ refusal to
take oaths or serve in the military).
301. See Abbott & Gottschalk, supra note 298, at 1, 2–4 (explaining
Christian Scientists’ beliefs about illness and healing).
302. Half are married to non-Jews, 61% of adults are college educated, and
29% live in households with an income over $150,000. A Portrait of Jewish
Americans, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1, 35–46 (2013), http://www.pewforum.org/files/
2013/10/jewish-american-full-report-for-web.pdf.
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neighbors, save for the need to celebrate certain religious
holidays and the preservation of infant circumcision. 303
The secular liberal state, then, is routinely confronted by
groups within the state whose members, collectively and
individually, not only prioritize their transcendental beliefs over
commitment to the state and its institutions, but in fact
experience conflicts with societal norms laws. 304 Thus, although
more conflicts (in magnitude and in number) are likely to arise
with respect to the practices of small and marginal religious
groups, 305 the test we propose may apply to any religious group,
no matter what its size or popularity.
In deciding whether there exists a religious group that has
religious claims mandating variant practices, we must look to a
group’s self-definition. 306 Mistaken attempts by outsiders to
define a religious group in order to characterize its beliefs could
lead to injustice and are clearly prohibited by the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For example, one
cannot look at practices of “Jews” as a single group to evaluate
the validity of claims regarding the centrality of circumcision by,
303. See B’rit Milah: The Circumcision Ritual, REFORM JUDAISM,
http://www.reformjudaism.org/brit-milah-circumcision-ritual (last visited July 6,
2015) (explaining the Jewish ritual of infant circumcision) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review); The Jewish Calendar, REFORM JUDAISM,
http://www.reformjudaism.org/brit-milah-circumcision-ritual (last visited July 6,
2015) (describing the Jewish calendar and providing information about each
holiday) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
304. See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text (discussing examples
of groups prioritizing their religious beliefs over societal norms and state
commitments such as contraceptive mandates and modern medicine).
305. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (explaining that “a
mainstream practice typically corresponds with social acceptability,” which
supports the notion that conflicts are more likely where the religious group is
small or marginal and thus not widely accepted by society).
306. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132
S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (explaining a religious group has the “right to shape its
own faith and mission”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (noting that the Free Exercise Clause protects all religious
beliefs, even beliefs that others cannot comprehend); Richard W. Garnett, Do
Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008) (“[T]he existence and independence of
religious institutions—self-defining, self-governing, self-directing institutions—
are needed . . . to ‘check the encroachments of secular power and preserve [the]
immunities’ of our ‘basic human things.”’ (citation omitted)).
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for example, Reform Judaism, which supports it, 307 or the small
Humanistic Jewish movement, for which infant circumcision is
optional. 308 Neither can one examine “Christians” as a totality to
decide whether Quakers are obliged to refrain from swearing
oaths. 309
It is reasonable for the state to test the sincerity of claimant’s
religious belief, but the state may not judge one person’s claims
by comparison to those espoused by other members, or even
leaders, of the same faith. 310 For example, if a group identifying
itself as the “Blue Jews” claimed draft exemption on the basis of a
heterodox scriptural interpretation 311 that required that they
wear only blue clothes, it would be reasonable for the government
to determine whether this was a sincere belief. It would be
inappropriate, however, for the government to deem that this
group’s belief was not Jewish. 312
307. See Resolution on Anti-Circumcision Initiative, UNION FOR REFORM
JUDAISM (June 13, 2011), http://urj.org/about/union/governance/reso/?syspage=
article&item_id=68500 (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (stating that infant male
circumcision is “an integral part of the divine covenant (brit milah) that has
existed for five thousand years between God and the Jewish people” and “a
central religious ritual”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
308. See, e.g., Statement on Circumcision and Jewish Identity, ORAYNU
CONGREGATION,
http://www.oraynu.org/about-us/philosophy/statement-oncircumcision-and-jewish-identity/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (“We welcome into
the Jewish community all who identify with the history, culture and fate of the
Jewish people. Circumcision is not required for Jewish identity.”) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
309. See James Bradley Thayer, A Chapter of Legal History in
Massachusetts, 9 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1895) (discussing Quakers and whether
they have to take an oath); Steve Sheppard, What Oaths Meant to the Framers’
Generation: A Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273, 279
(2009) (explaining the meaning of an oath and whether Quakers could take the
oath).
310. See United States v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“But we hasten to
emphasize that while the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there
remains the significant question whether it is ‘truly held.’”); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88–90 (1944) (Stone, J., dissenting) (arguing that the jury
correctly found that the petitioners did not honestly believe religious
experiences had occurred).
311. See Numbers 15:38 (“Speak to the Israelites and say to them:
‘Throughout the generations to come you are to make tassels on the corners of
your garments, with a blue cord on each tassel.’”).
312. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185 (emphasizing that “the truth of a belief is
not open to question” by the government or any other party). The term “group”
here may be misleading, because in the United States, even a single individual’s
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Finally, American law does not even require membership in a
recognized religious group at all for a person to enjoy religious
freedom. 313 In fact, laws that give special accommodations to only
“recognized” religious groups are struck down as unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause. 314 To be sure, people who
profess idiosyncratic religious beliefs present a significant
challenge to the legal system. 315 Policymakers will often be
unaware of a generally applicable law’s potential conflict with the
beliefs and practices of such a person and so will be unable to
consider whether to make such an accommodation. 316 Moreover,
there is a greater concern that professed idiosyncratic beliefs may
not be truly sincere—and that they therefore may be adopted
principally as a “cover” for a person’s non-religious preferences—
than there is when it comes to recognized religious
idiosyncratic religious beliefs generally are treated as deserving of the same
legal protection as those of more recognized groups. It may be easier for a group
with a long history, canonical texts, a well-established hermeneutic tradition, a
large membership, formal rules, and sources of authority to demonstrate
sincerity than for a single individual to do so. However, these should not be
dispositive. It is also reasonable to ask whether a religious rationale is
pretextual whether the religion in question has one adherent or millions.
313. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); Frazee
v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (asserting that a personal religious
faith is “entitled to as much protection as one espoused by an organized group”).
314. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
(“The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.”); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (2002) (striking
down an Arkansas statute that required applicants for religious exemptions to
vaccinations to belong to a “recognized religious organization” that opposed
vaccination as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
315. See Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 593–95 (7th Cir. 2011)
(discussing a prison inmate’s belief that his interpretation of the Moorish
Tenants of America and the State’s conflict as to whether his idiosyncratic
interpretation of the religion’s established practices were constitutionally
protected, and holding that the inmate was entitled to protection if he could
prove his beliefs were sincere).
316. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1524 (1999) (posing an example of an employer with
idiosyncratic religious beliefs that conflict with a generally-applicable minimum
wage mandate, and discussing the potential for a common-law exemption
regime as opposed to a regime where those beliefs go unnoticed by
policymakers).
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communities. 317 Strictly speaking, though, membership in a
recognized religious group is not a prerequisite for religious
freedom claimants. 318
c. The Types of Risks, Burdens, Harms, and Costs Contemplated
by the Test
Although the test and our discussion uses the terms risks,
burdens, harms, and costs in variety, as appropriate for the
particular issue, we generally recognize that these terms are
often interchangeable.
The burdens on society at large or on non-members of the
religious group contemplated by the Indirect Effects basis
obviously can include health- and safety-related concerns. 319 For
instance, refusal to vaccinate a child directly jeopardizes those
outside a religion who are unable to be vaccinated successfully. 320
Likewise, whether a state may ban a Sikh from carrying his
kirpan (ceremonial dagger) to school also relates to health and
safety concerns. 321 However, the Indirect Effects prong also might
317. See supra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing the
constitutionality of testing the “sincerity” of a party’s religious beliefs, and
examining the Ballard and Seeger holdings where proper methods and
limitations on this testing were discussed); see also Vinning-El, 657 F.3d at 595
(exploring the concern of the state and courts over whether an individual’s
idiosyncratic religious mandate was “sincerely held” and allowing that test to go
to a jury).
318. See supra note 313 and accompanying text (demonstrating the law’s
considerable protection for individual religious freedom claims).
319. See supra Part IV.A.1.b (discussing the operation of the “Indirect
Effects” basis of the test, and that where a practice “creates unreasonable
burdens for (i) society as a whole or (ii) members of society outside the religious
group,” the government “has a constitutional obligation to limit the practice”).
320. See Daniel A Salmon et al., Compulsory Vaccination and Conscientious
or Philosophical Exemptions: Past, Present, and Future, 367 LANCET 436, 436
(2006) (explaining the danger presented to members of society who cannot
obtain a successful vaccination by exposure to a child who is not vaccinated for
religious reasons, but could have been otherwise). We discuss the issue of in
greater detail infra Part IV.C.2.
321. Without taking a position as to whether this practice may (or should) be
outlawed under our proposed test, we note that the Canadian Supreme Court
allowed the practice, deciding that the kirpan posed minimal risk to other
children. See Multani v. Comm’n scolair Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 1 S.C.R. 6
(2006) (finding that the Orthodox Sikh’s religious freedom had been infringed);
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apply to cases that do not involve concerns of health or safety, but
rather the imposition of substantial material or financial costs on
society. 322 For instance, a society might choose to decline to pay
for prolonged or indefinite care for a terminally ill and
unconscious child who is not expected to regain consciousness
because of the costs this imposes on society, both with respect to
the monetary expense and the use of medical resources.
In contrast, the Direct Effects prong, which seeks to protect
the children of the religious group from harmful religious
practices directed at them, contemplates only major health
(physical and psychological) and safety-related harms. 323 General
standards of medical ethics and the laws of most jurisdictions
recognize the best interests of the child as a key factor for
determining how best legally to protect a child. 324 All U.S.
jurisdictions recognize this standard as determinative with
regard to custody cases. 325 The best interest standard is poorly
see also Shaheen Shariff, Balancing Competing Rights: A Stakeholder Model for
Democratic Schools, 29 CAN. J. EDUC. 476, 481–89 (2006) (discussing the social
implications of the Multani holding).
322. For example, the daily cost of caring for a patient in a pediatric
intensive care unit from 2004 to 2007 was $3,565. See Jeffrey D. Edwards, Chris
Rivanis, Sheila S. Kun, Aaron B. Caughey & Thomas G. Keens, Costs of
Hospitalized Ventilator-Dependent Children: Differences Between a Ventilator
Ward and Intensive Care Unit, 46 PEDIATRIC PULMONOLOGY 356, 356–61 (2011).
If a minority practice incurred large volumes of such care, the Indirect Care
prong might be invoked.
323. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (introducing the “Direct Effects” prong and
explaining that if the practice affects children by creating a “substantial chance
of death or major disruption of a physiological function” or other “severe harmful
effects, such as malnutrition or major psychological morbidity,” then the
government has a constitutional obligation to limit it).
324. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Methods & Principles in Biomedical Ethics, 29
J. MED. ETHICS 269, 269–70 (2003)
Well before autonomy and privacy were pervasively applied through
law and morals to the decisions of surrogates for incompetents and
minors, the best interests standard—rather than an autonomy
standard—was recognized as having authority over parental rights. It
is the fitting standard for analysis of the case before us. The best
interests standard validly overrides parental rights of control
whenever the welfare interest of the child is substantial. If the
interests of the child were less than substantial—for example, if the
outcome of a surgical intervention had merely the effect of an
unobtrusive scar—then deference to parental wishes would be
reasonable.
325. Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best
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defined, though, and is often conclusory in practice. 326 Legislation
typically lays out guidelines with numerous factors and gives
judges broad discretion to balance these factors in deciding
individual cases. 327 It is fair to say as a general matter, that in
the United States “[t]he best interests of the child are served by a
parenting arrangement that best maintains a child’s emotional
Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 117 (2009) (“State legislatures have
universally adopted the BICS [Best Interests of the Child Standard] and applied
it to determine custody and visitation disputes.”).
326. See Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of
Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 350 (1993) (arguing that the “best
interest” standard is vague and uncertain and result in conclusory judgments by
the trial court judges).
327. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–56 (2013)
[T]he court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing
so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the
following factors: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of
the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to
understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and
material information obtained from the child, including the informed
preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child’s parents as to
custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the
child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who
may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the
willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;
(7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an
effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (8) the ability of
each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the
child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community
environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a
stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of
maintaining continuity in such environment . . . ; (11) the stability of
the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental
and physical health of all individuals involved . . . except that a
disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of
itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed
custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the
child’s cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions
of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the
parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;
(15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or
neglected . . . ; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed
participation in a parenting education program . . . . The court is not
required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.
(emphasis added).
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growth, health and stability, and physical care.” 328 The best
interests of the child are, however, balanced in most jurisdictions
against “a parent’s constitutionally protected right to raise a child
and maintain a relationship with that child, without undue
interference by the state.” 329 Not only do parents have rights, but
there is a rebuttable presumption that parental decisions are in
the child’s best interest. 330
Dangerous practices that can subject a child to the possibility
of death can include withholding transfusion, 331 withholding
other forms of medical care, 332 or sacramental venomous snake
handling. 333 Some practices may not endanger life, but create a
328. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 172 (Wash. 2005) (quoting WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.002 (2007)).
329. N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v.
A.L., 59 A.3d 576, 585 (N.J. 2013) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
E.P., 952 A.2d 436, 444 (N.J. 2008)); see Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925) (holding that parents have the liberty to direct the upbringing
and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)
(stating that it is the natural duty of the parents to give their children suitable
education).
330. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S 57, 68–69 (2000) (explaining that there
is usually no reason for the State to get involved in family issues as long as the
parent adequately cares for his or her children).
331. See In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Mass. 1991) (explaining that
parents who were Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to consent to blood transfusions
for their daughter); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 753 (N.J. 1962) (stating
that parents who were Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to grant permission for
their son to get a necessary blood transfusion).
332. See State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560, 591 (Wis. 2013) (ruling that
prosecuting parents for reckless homicide because they did not seek medical
treatment for their child did not violate the parents’ free exercise rights);
Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d. 852, 855 (Cal. 1988) (concluding that
prosecution is permitted against a mother whose child died after receiving
prayer instead of medical treatment).
333. See Mary L. Daugherty, Serpent-Handling as Sacrament, 33 THEOLOGY
TODAY 232, 232 (1976) (“For many years mountain people have suffered terrible
pain and many have died from snake bite. Small wonder that it is considered
the ultimate act of faith to reach out and take up the serpent.”). Daugherty
states that children do not handle snakes. See id. at 241 (“Children are kept far
away.”). However, others claim that children may occasionally participate in
these rituals. See Steven M. Kane, Holy Ghost People: The Snake-Handlers of
Southern Appalachia, 1 APPALACHIAN J. 255, 260 (1974) (“Although devotees
report that children as young as six have handled snakes, I have not observed
any person younger than nineteen do so.”). There are documented incidents over
seventy years old of children handling snakes at religious services. See Michael
J. McVicar, Take Away the Serpents from Us: The Sign of Serpent Handling and
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substantial chance of major physiological disruption. For
example, the obsolete Chinese practice of binding the feet of
girls 334 can sufficiently limit locomotion that it could be banned
under this justification. Extensive female genital alterations that
make sex painful or vaginal delivery dangerous 335 also could be
banned on this basis.
The Direct Effects provision also allows for the restriction of
a religious practice if it causes other kinds of objectively severe
harmful effects to a child of the religious group. 336 Here, too, we
focus on health and safety concerns, but it is critical to note that
psychological impairment can be sufficient to constitute such
harm. 337 These could be, for example, major psychological
morbidity or physical mutilation that would reduce a child’s
the Development of Southern Pentecostalism, 15 J. S. RELIGION (2013) (discussing
the rise of serpent-handling and “holiness worship” beginning in the 1930s).
334. See Yuhui Li, Women’s Movement and Change of Women’s Status in
China, 1 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 30, 30 (2000) (explaining the practice of
foot-binding).
335. See Utz-Billing & Kentenich, supra note 6, at 227 (giving an overview of
vaginal alteration procedures and discussing negative consequences relating to
health and reproduction); S.H.A. Andersson et al., Sexual Quality of Life in
Women Who Have Undergone Female Genital Mutilation: A Case-Control Study,
119 INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1606, 1608 (2012) (discussing the
painful side effects and other sexual repercussions experienced by a majority of
women studied who had experienced female genitalia mutilation). But see
Bergitta Essén et al., No Association Between Female Circumcision and
Prolonged Labour: A Case Control Study of Immigrant Women Giving Birth in
Sweden, 121 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY REPROD. BIOL. 182, 182–83 (2005)
(comparing the labor statistics of sixty-eight African women who underwent
female circumcision to 2,486 uncircumcised Swedish women and finding that
the former bore a lower risk of prolonged labor); S. Wuest et al., Effects of
Female Genital Mutilation on Birth Outcomes in Switzerland, 116 INT’L J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1204, 1207 (2009) (discussing study results that
found a lower rate of prolonged labor and birth risks in Swedish females who
underwent female genitalia mutilation, and stating that the same women under
managed care did not show a propensity for higher maternal and female
morbidity). See generally Taha Abd El-Naser et al., Sexual Side Effects of
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting May Be Type Dependent: A Hospital-Based
Study, 1 KOSR AL-AINI J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 65, 67–72 (2010).
336. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (explaining that where “the practice affects
children and other vulnerable members of the religious group . . . by creating
other objectively severe harmful effects,” the state has an obligation to limit the
practice).
337. See id. (establishing “major psychological morbidity” as an example of a
sufficient harm to constitute a direct effect under the test).
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ability to function in the general society. 338 Thus, even if labial
reduction did not constitute a danger to a major physiological
function, it nonetheless would likely cause major psychological
morbidity if it were performed without anesthesia upon a
non-consenting adolescent. 339 It might also apply to practices that
markedly limit the child’s future occupational capacity; for
example, permanent facial alterations such as tattooing340 or
scarification341 religious rituals, which are not often seen in the
338. To the extent that liberal pluralists accept illiberal minorities, they
tend to require that there be free egress from the group—some have made this
point explicitly. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 19, at 528 (arguing for enforcing
prohibitions against preventing someone from leaving a group); Mark D. Rosen,
The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist Religious Groups in a Liberal State,
1 J. L., RELIGION & ST. 16, 17 (2012) (arguing for autonomy of illiberal minorities
subject to an “opt-out” constraint). Others have made it implicitly, in asserting
that freedom, religion, or human rights in general must constrain acceptance for
minority groups. See generally Amy Gutmann, Introduction to CHARLES TAYLOR
ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 10–11
(Amy Gutmann, ed. 1994); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS 92–94
(2007). This is in contrast to a regime such as the Ottoman millet system, in
which members of minorities were under the jurisdiction of that community,
and egress from the community was restricted. See generally Karen Barkey,
Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model, 19 INT. J. POL.,
CULTURE, & SOC’Y 5 (2005); Timur Kuran, The Economic Ascent of the Middle
East’s Religious Minorities: The Role of Islamic Legal Pluralism, 33 J. LEGAL
STUD. 475 (2004). Israel maintains remnants of this system, giving religious
courts exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce. See Yüksel Sezgin, The
Israeli Millet System: Examining Legal Pluralism Through Lenses of
Nation-Building and Human Rights, 43 ISR. L. REV. 631, 631 (2010) (“The millet
system that Israel adopted upon its independence was a highly pluralized and
decentralized legal system under which the Ottoman and British imperial
authorities granted juridical autonomy over matters of personal status.”).
339. See generally Arora & Jacobs, supra note 7 (discussing ethics and policy
surrounding female genital mutilation, and potential psychological impacts on
non-consented operations).
340. See John Barker & Anne Marie Tietjen, Women’s Facial Tattooing
Among the Maisin of Oro Province, Papua New Guinea: The Changing
Significance of an Ancient Custom, 60 OCEANIA 217, 217 (1990) (describing the
tradition of facial tattooing); Christian Palmer & Mervyn L. Tano, Mokomokai:
Commercialization and Desacralization, N.Z. ELEC. TEXT CENTRE (2007),
http://www.iiirm.org/publications/Articles%20Reports%20Papers/
Genetics%20and%20Biotechnology/mokomokai.pdf (discussing the Maori
culture and the practice of facial tattooing). Tattooing was a puberty ritual
imbued with sacred significance. See id. (“For women of chiefly rank, tattooing
was an important ceremony that accompanied puberty and marked the entry
into womanhood.”).
341. See, e.g., Ọlanikẹ Ọla Orie, The Structure and Function of Yoruba Facial
Scarification, 53 ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS 15, 15 (2011) (stating that the
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United States, 342 might negatively affect a child’s social
acceptability and employability. 343 Therefore, although ritual
tattooing and scarification have no major physiological effect, a
liberal society might be justified in prohibiting them under this
provision.
d. The Likelihood of Burdens Associated with the Test
The test, through the Likelihood prong, addresses whether
the religious practice imposes substantial risk of direct or indirect
harms. 344 It could not be otherwise, for it is often impossible to
say with certainty whether the withholding of a particular
medical treatment—or, even more obviously, of a vaccination—
will cause an actual harm to a specific individual. 345 Society may
still choose to protect itself and children of the religious group
from the increased risk of harm imposed by the religious
practice. 346
Yoruba etched identification marks into their faces).
342. But see Jana C. Saunders & Myrna L. Armstrong, Experiences and
Influences of Women with Cosmetic Tattooing, 17 DERMATALOGICAL NURSING 23,
23 (2005) (discussing tattooing procedures performed for exclusively aesthetic
reasons in some developed cultures).
343. See Randy K. Chiu & Richard D. Babcock, The Relative Importance of
Facial Attractiveness and Gender in Hong Kong Selection Decisions, 13 INT. J.
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 141, 141 (2002) (“This field experiment found that Hong
Kong human resources management specialists were influenced by the
attractiveness bias in evaluating short-listed candidates for an entry-level
trainee position.”); Marlene Rankin & Gregory L. Borah, Perceived Functional
Impact of Abnormal Facial Appearance, 111 PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY
2140, 2140 (2003) (“The purpose of this study was to establish a large,
sample-based evaluation of the perceived social functioning, interpersonal
characteristics, and employability indices for a range of facial appearances
(normal and abnormal).”).
344. See supra Part IV.A.2 (“In order to constitute a basis for restricting a
religious practice, the burdens, costs, risks, or harms must be actual, rather
than merely hypothetical, and must not be unlikely.”).
345. See, e.g., Harrison v. Tauheed, 235 P.3d 547, 557 (Kan. App. 2010)
(evaluating whether it was important to determine actual harm to the
individual in applying a standard of review to religious beliefs and practices of a
parent applying for custody of their child).
346. See Harriet Hall, Faith Healing: Religious Freedom vs. Child
Protection, SCIENCE-BASED MED. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.science
basedmedicine.org/faith-healing-religious-freedom-vs-child-protection/ (last visited
Jan. 21, 2016) (discussing various religious exercises that have denied children
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The issue of “risk of harm” is hardly a novel one in the law;
courts have long had to deal with environmental hazards and
product safety cases in which plaintiffs seek relief based on the
risk of harm, rather than on an actual occurrence. 347 The
question in these cases is whether a risk is sufficiently great to
provide the plaintiff with standing to sue. This is analogous to
our question of whether a risk of harm is sufficiently great to
allow restrictive legislation. To be considered a controversy under
the current interpretation of the Cases and Controversies Clause
of the Constitution, 348 a claim must allege injuries that are
“(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” 349 We suggest a similar, though
perhaps slightly broader, approach to the question of risk in our
test. 350
Thus, as the Likelihood prong clarifies, the risk of harm must
be actual, rather than merely hypothetical, and it may not be
unlikely. 351 That is, the nature of the injury must be known, and
although it is not necessary to identify the specific individuals
who will suffer the injury, it is sufficient to identify a reasonably
increased risk of injury. 352 In other words, there is an inchoate
medical treatments or care, and certain actions by states an social groups to
limit these religious exercises where the danger to children is too great) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
347. See, e.g., Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that the plaintiff brought suit because Apple’s iPod posed a risk of
hearing loss); Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 449 (10th
Cir. 1996) (requiring a litigant to show an increased risk in environmental
harm).
348. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the jurisdiction of federal
courts established by Article III to certain “cases” and “controversies” mostly
involving the United States or a state as a party, or cases arising under the
Constitution or an international treaty).
349. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
350. Current standing doctrine appears to not consider increased risk if it is
broadly shared throughout society and not specifically focused on an individual
person. See F. Andrew Hessick, Probalistic Standing, 106 NW. L. REV. 55, 67
(2012) (discussing the development of the “probabilistic standing” doctrine,
which places less emphasis on increased risk where an individual claimant is
not the sole focus). Our conception for the purpose of our test is slightly broader.
351. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (defining the scope and
operation of the Likelihood prong).
352. See, e.g., Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 570–75 (6th
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class of individuals who definitely will suffer harm, and the
nature of the harm can be identified, but the identity of those
individuals within the group who will experience the harm
cannot be known in advance. 353 That said, the degree to which a
risk becomes intolerable for society and thus that it becomes
defensible for a practice to be prohibited is uncertain, subject to
reasonable disagreement, requires the application of judgment,
and is typically the province of legislators and other
policymakers.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical religion that initiates
children using baptism by immersion in water at the age of four.
The state proposes to abolish this practice because it might create
phobias with regard to water and because a convincing scientific
model shows a risk of death due to the shock of the immersion of
1 in 4 billion. 354 Neither of these justifications passes muster
under our test; the notion that a practice “might” create phobias
is a hypothesized, rather than an actual harm, and a risk of death
of 1 in 4 billion surely qualifies as unlikely. 355

Cir. 2005) (deciding that there is standing based upon an increased risk of
future harm); Covington v. Jefferson Cty., 358 F.3d 626, 639 (9th Cir. 2004)
(stating that the question for injury-in-fact is whether the defendant’s actions
caused reasonable concern of injury); Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir.
2003) (concluding that “exposure to an enhanced risk of disease transmission may
qualify as injury-in-fact”). The D.C. Circuit, which hears the bulk of appeals of
challenges to regulations, rejected rare events as a basis for action. Tracking the
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, we also reject restriction based on rare or
hypothetical events.
353. See Allan J. Jacobs, Is State Power to Protect Health Compatible with
Substantive Due Process Rights?, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 113, 116 (2011)
(“Second, it will characterize the beneficiaries of public health laws as those
persons who would actually suffer injurious consequences from the
government’s failure to act. The identity of these individuals, however, often
cannot be determined in advance.”).
354. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(holding that a plaintiff did not have standing to sue for an injury that had a
probability of 1 in 4.2 billion per person per year).
355. In addition, the Magnitude prong of the test prohibits such a ban
because there is no law against taking a child of the same age into a swimming
pool and quickly dunking them as part of the process of learning to swim.

988

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2016)

e. The Magnitude Limitation: Tolerance of Harmful Mainstream
Practices Requires Tolerance of Comparably Harmful Religious
Practices
To understand the limitation imposed by the Magnitude
prong, consider a hypothetical case in which 50,000 Americans
have settled in a non-Western nation, forming 1% of that nation’s
population. The Americans, seeking to maintain their cultural
identity, belong to churches that sincerely believe that American
football develops character traits that boys should possess. The
Americans educate their children in church schools that
incorporate football as an integral part of the boys’ curriculum.
Eventually, the number of injuries football players incur appalls
the general public in the host nation, 356 and it is considering
criminally penalizing adults who organize football programs. The
injury rate of 2% per high school game or practice, with
concussions occurring once in every 300 athletic-exposures, 357
may be sufficient to allow prohibition under our test. However,
the inquiry does not end there; if the host society encourages its
boys to box and play ice hockey, the Magnitude prong would
make it impermissible to abolish football. 358 In that case, the host
society has a comparably dangerous sports ritual, and the ban on
football would represent discrimination. 359 However, a gentle
nation that discourages competitive violent sports would
appropriately ban football, despite the desires of participating
parents and children to the contrary.
356. See generally Randall Dick et al., Descriptive Epidemiology of Collegiate
Men’s Football Injuries: National Collegiate Athletic Association Injury
Surveillance System, 1988–1989 Through 2003–2004, 42 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING
221 (2007) (collecting data of injuries among college football players); Prasad R.
Shankar et al., Epidemiology of High School and Collegiate Football Injuries in
the United States, 2005–2006, 35 AMER. J. SPORTS MED. 1295 (2007) (comparing
the number of injuries between high school and college football players).
357. Shankar, supra note 356, tbl.1. An athletic exposure is a single athlete
in a single competition or practice.
358. See supra Part IV.A.3 (“Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if
society tolerates harms from comparable mainstream practices that imposes
harms of a similar magnitude to the harms posed by the religious practice at
issue, then it should not restrict that religious practice.”).
359. See id. (applying the logic of the test’s operation to this hypothetical
and determining that it would treat the sports exercises as “comparable” under
the Magnitude prong).
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Thus, similar to Likelihood prong, the Magnitude prong
imposes constraints on the Bases for Possible Restriction,
providing that in order to ban a religious practice that meets the
criteria set forth in the Bases, society cannot simultaneously
tolerate comparable mainstream practices—religious or not—that
impose similar harms. For a realistic example, if a society
tolerates infant circumcision performed by a doctor in hospitals
for non-religious reasons, it must also tolerate religious Jews’
practice of home infant circumcision performed by a trained
mohel (Jewish circumciser) unless the risks associated with this
religious practice are of greater magnitude than those associated
with the non-religious practice. 360
The limitation reflected in the Magnitude prong serves three
functions. First, as a substantive matter, it aids policymakers and
judges in identifying those religious practices that impose
intolerable burdens on children and third parties under the first
prong. In a vacuum, it can be difficult to determine whether the
risks associated with a religious practice merit the legal sanction
of the practice. 361 Society tolerates and sometimes encourages
harmful secular practices of all sorts, after all. 362 Courts are
particularly ill-suited to decide whether the risk of harm imposed
by a particular practice is too great for society to bear. 363 By
requiring policymakers, and judges in particular, to compare the
religious practice in question with other comparable practices,
the substantive intolerability of the religious practice would be
illuminated. If society tolerates the risk for the comparable
mainstream practice, then the risk is evidently not intolerable;
but if it has outlawed the mainstream practice, then society has
apparently already deemed the risks intolerable. In either case, it
360. See supra notes 306–308 and accompanying text (discussing the Jewish
circumcision custom and issues in greater detail).
361. See Richard W. Garnett, Note, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family,
Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 115–
16 (2000) (discussing the balance between free-exercise values and protecting
children).
362. See supra notes 356–357 and accompanying text (providing statistics of
the dangers of playing football, a secular activity that children are often
encouraged to play and is tolerated in America).
363. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1683
(explaining why majoritarian branches should decide on religious
accommodation instead of courts).
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must treat the religious practice comparably. Broadening
policymakers’ and judges’ focus when considering a ban on a
religious practice to include comparing to mainstream practices
with similar sorts of risks can thereby serve as a powerful and
useful heuristic for determining whether the potential harms
arising from the practice are substantively intolerable.
Second, this symmetrical sorting mechanism also responds to
the concerns raised by the public choice problem identified
above 364 by giving policymakers and judges a principled tool for
considering religious accommodations and restrictions on
religious practices. Rather than relying on ad hoc determinations
and the dynamics of the political marketplace, and thus
empowering
cohesive
lobbying
groups
(whether
pro-accommodation or pro-restriction) at the potential expense of
the diffuse majority, 365 they would instead consider such
individual questions in the broader context of the law. If a
religious group lobbied to permit a practice that imposes harms
on others that are not tolerated with respect to the analogous
secular practices, that religious group would not receive the
accommodation. 366 At the same time, if a majority within society
or a powerful non-religious lobbying group lobbies to outlaw a
religious practice, the effort would be denied if society at large
was unwilling to impose the same restrictions on its own similar
practices. 367 In turn, this could reduce the outsize power of
364. See supra Part III.B (introducing the concept of public choice theory
and discussing how implementing the test “can model the circumstances in
which the political branches will underprotect and overprotect religious
liberty”).
365. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE GOVERNMENT WE DESERVE 59 (1998)
(discussing the rise of modern cohesive lobbying strategies and how they are
empowered or diffused when “complex public policies [produce] different impacts
for different groups”).
366. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE
L.J. 530, 531–35 (2013) (discussing several theories on why religious practices
that are potentially harmful should or should not receive accommodations or be
“singled out”).
367. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 536 (1993) (describing a city ordinance that targets religious animal
sacrifice but allows other killings, which was invalidated); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n,
Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2002) (invalidating the
discriminatory enforcement of a law that required the removal of attachments to
utility poles affixed by Orthodox Jewish residents but allowed other materials to
be attached to the poles).
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interest group lobbying in our political system by giving voice to
the diffuse majority, while at the same time encouraging religious
groups and other groups to work collaboratively to find principled
or mutually-satisfactory compromises that are not currently the
norm in American politics. 368
Third, this limitation on the ability of society to ban religious
practices also helps to resolve the difficult Establishment Clause
problem we have identified. 369 The Supreme Court has suggested
that legal tolerance or accommodation of religious practices that
impose third-party harms potentially violate the Establishment
Clause. 370 That is, when the state’s legal apparatus permits
religious groups to impose costs on unwilling third parties, it is
essentially permitting a kind of religious rule within society. 371
On the other hand, it is also the case that society has long
accommodated many religious practices that impose costs and
harms on third parties; for instance, tax benefits given to
religious non-profit institutions impose costs on others because
they shift costs elsewhere in society. 372 The longstanding practice
of granting draft exemptions on the basis of religious belief harm
those who must be drafted in place of those granted such
exemptions. 373 Yet courts have not questioned these practices
under the Establishment Clause. 374 And so we are left with a
368. See Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows, supra note 174, at 1066–67
(explaining why it is currently not the norm for religious groups to compromise
with others).
369. See supra Part III.C (discussing the Establishment Clause and the
conflicts that arise when potentially limiting the exercise of religious practices
and beliefs).
370. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1655
(discussing the line of cases that interpret the Establishment Clause to limit the
accommodation of religious practices that harm third parties).
371. See id. at 1656 (stating that “majoritarian branches are often eager—
overeager, perhaps—to accommodate religious groups’ interests” and concluding
that the phenomenon is resulting in religious minorities somewhat dictating
majoritarian public policy).
372. See supra notes 241–242 and accompanying text (discussing the Smith
holding and the contrasting viewpoints on religious accommodation that spring
from it).
373. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the Free
Exercise Clause of the Constitution and its impact on several cases, including a
military draft exemption).
374. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (discussing the
Establishment Clause’s role in adjudicating draft exemptions for religious
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difficult question: When a religious practice imposes costs and
risks on third parties, how can we tell whether tolerance of that
practice violates the Establishment Clause? In other words, how
do we draw the line?
The Magnitude prong offers a potential means of resolving
this question in many cases. 375 If a society accepts similar costs
when imposed on non-religious grounds, then there is no
Establishment Clause violation, because society has decided that
these are tolerable costs of living in that society. 376 On the other
hand, if society rejects these costs when imposed by non-religious
practices, then it has in fact said that there is something so
intolerable about the risks and harms associated with the
practice that we will not allow anyone to be subjected to them.
Consequently, giving legal dispensation to religious groups alone
to impose such costs on others strongly suggests an
Establishment Clause violation. 377
Consider again the military draft exemption. 378 Society has
always chosen to exempt some people from the draft for a variety
of reasons, thereby imposing risks and harms on others: People
pursuing certain educational opportunities; 379 people in certain
jobs or positions of power; 380 people with certain family
reasons, and framing the appellant’s successful argument within its language).
375. See supra Part IV.A.3 (defining the test’s Magnitude prong).
376. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (discussing the
evils which the Establishment Clause aims to protect against, and tests for
finding an Establishment Clause violation based upon whether “its principal or
primary effect . . . neither advances nor inhibits religion”).
377. See id. at 635 (Douglas, J., concurring) (using the example of a
Christian schoolteacher to discuss the potential for an Establishment Clause
violation where religious accommodations are used to “indoctrinate” or unfairly
impose costs on society).
378. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (laying out the military
draft example).
379. See Anne Yoder, Military Classifications for Draftees, SWARTHMORE
COLL.
PEACE
COLLECTION,
http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/
conscientiousobjection/MilitaryClassifications.htm (last updated Mar. 2014)
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (compiling the different classifications and
exemptions for each draft statute) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
380. See id. (discussing ministerial students in category 2–D and student
postponements in the notes below the latest table in the 2002 Act, as well as
various student exemptions in previous iterations).
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obligations; 381 people who, though physically fit and capable, age
out of the draft; 382 people whose draft numbers simply are not
called; 383 and non-religious people with conscientious objections
to military service. 384 All of these people may be free from the
burden of military service, thus imposing the burden of military
service on others in society who do not share these criteria. 385
Evidently—for better or worse—we have collectively chosen to
bear the costs of these exemptions, accepting them across society.
Extending the same sort of accommodation to those who have
religious beliefs that prohibit them from serving in the military,
and the consequent cost on third parties, therefore does not
violate the Establishment Clause. 386
C. The Test in Action
In explaining the contours of our test, we have already briefly
discussed some examples. We now discuss several of those
examples in greater detail and consider several others to
demonstrate how the test would apply in a variety of cases. For
the sake of argument we assume that each of the practices we

381. See id. (showing various “essential employment” deferral categories
throughout the history of the Selective Service Act, such as “essential civilian
employment” and “essential agricultural employment”).
382. See id. (offering exemptions for “hardship” to families, or where
“dependents” exist).
383. See Fast Facts About Selective Service, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS.,
https://www.sss.gov/Public-Affairs/Juvenile-Justice-Toolkit/Fast-Facts
(last
updated Aug. 21, 2014) (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (“In a crisis requiring a draft,
men would be called in sequence determined by random lottery number and
year of birth.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
384. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1300.06, CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS (2007), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf
(outlining exemptions for conscientious objectors under the current Selective
Service Act).
385. See Yoder, supra note 379 (showing various “available for service” and
“limited service” classifications for those who do not meet exemption criteria).
386. Such an accommodation would likely pass muster under a modern
Establishment Clause evaluation. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–
13 (1971) (discussing the three “main evils” that constitute a violation of the
Establishment Clause, including a “secular legislative purpose” and not
fostering “government entanglement with religion”).
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introduce has a religious basis. 387 We also consider how our
analysis compares to the decisions of American policymakers and
judges. In some cases, the law is aligned with our test; in others,
our test would require changes to the law.
1. Cases Involving Religious Practices that Allegedly Harm
In-Group Children
First, consider cases on opposite sides of the harm spectrum.
On the one hand are religious practices that involve withholding
medical treatment of children. 388 State legislatures have treated
this practice with astonishing solicitude—“Nearly every state
provides exemptions in their child abuse, neglect, or
endangerment statutes for spiritual healing” 389—while three
states go so far as to allow parents to “assert their religious
beliefs as an affirmative defense to murder.” 390 In other words,
although the state typically demands, at pain of criminal
sanction, that parents provide appropriate health care and
treatment for their children, virtually every state legislature has
decided to accept greater risk to the health and life of children of
religious parents. 391
For a specific example of denial of medical care, Jehovah’s
Witnesses do not accept blood transfusion, and some have
attempted to prevent their children from obtaining transfusion. 392
387. Not all of them necessarily do, in fact, and people may disagree about
others. We do not take a practical stand on this question and instead simply
assume that each of the practices has a religious basis.
388. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (describing treatment of
various religious practices denying children medical treatment or care).
389. Jennifer L. Hartsell, Comment, Mother May I . . . Live? Parental
Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for Children Based on Religious
Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499, 509 (1999).
390. Id.
391. See id. at 510 (“Most state exemptions provide either that a parent is
not abusive or neglectful ‘for the sole reason’ that the parent uses spiritual
treatment[,] or that a child being treated spiritually is not abused or neglected
‘for that reason alone.’”).
392. See Jehovah’s Witness (WTS) Opposition to Blood Transfusions,
RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG (Sept. 29, 1996), http://www.religioustolerance.org/
witness13.htm (last updated July 27, 2008) (last visited Jan. 22, 2016)
(“The Jehovah’s Witnesses urge[] its members to refuse to accept blood
transfusions and to not allow them to be given to their children. This is
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Our test would allow—indeed, require, under the Establishment
Clause—governments to prohibit parents from denying such care
because such denial represents a threat to the life of a child, thus
comprising a direct effect, that is actual and likely, thus
satisfying the Likelihood prong. 393 There are no comparable
mainstream practices permitted by the law, so the Magnitude
prong is satisfied. 394 Indeed, parents who withhold medically
necessary treatment from their children for non-religious reasons
can be criminally and civilly sanctioned. 395 Furthermore, courts
can reduce parental rights, at least to the extent of appointing a
guardian to make health care decisions on the child's behalf. 396
Indeed, courts have required transfusions under these
circumstances, 397 but they should go further and strike down as
unconstitutional those laws that prevent criminal and civil
punishment of parents who successfully refuse to allow their
children to be transfused or who withhold other critically
necessary medical care.
The practice of piercing the ears of infants and minors is at
the other end of the spectrum. 398 This practice is an essentially
innocuous one, apart from a small amount of momentary pain
primarily based upon four passages in the Bible which they interpret as
prohibiting the consuming of blood.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
393. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Direct Effect and Likelihood prongs
of the test, and their operation).
394. See supra Part IV.A.3 (defining the operation of the Magnitude prong of
the test).
395. See Hartsell, supra note 389, at 510 (discussing statutes in West
Virginia, Arkansas, and Oregon that limit murder exemptions to cases where
the practices meet certain requirements and act according to the beliefs of a
“recognized religious denomination”).
396. See Health Care Decision-Making Authority: Who Makes The Decision?,
ABA COMMISSION ON L. & AGING (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/Who_Makes_the_Decision.authcheck
dam.pdf (displaying tables with various statutes and ordinances authorizing
courts to appoint guardians and terminate parental rights for health care
decision-making).
397. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 757 (N.J. 1962) (finding that
there was a compelling necessity to protect the child).
398. See infra notes 399–402 and accompanying text (examining the costs
and effects of ear piercing and suggesting that ear piercing has little impact on
children).
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and a small possibility of minor local infection. 399 Ritual ear
piercing would be permissible under our test, both because it does
not meet the criteria of the Bases for Possible Restriction and
because, in any event, it fails under the Magnitude prong because
minors, including infants, commonly have their ears pierced for
esthetic reasons. 400 Not surprisingly, we have found no evidence
of American courts or legislatures attempting to ban parentally
approved ear piercing of children. 401
Now consider how the test would apply in some more
contentious cases. 402 Male infant ritual circumcision has become a
controversial issue in some Western countries 403 and even in
certain communities in the United States. 404 Ritual circumcision
of infant boys, practiced by Jews and Muslims, is claimed by some
to cause major loss of sexual function. 405 If this were true, it
399. See Jennifer Felsher, Ear Piercing No Longer a Pain, NEWSWISE (Sept.
22, 2000), http://www.newswise.com/articles/ear-piercing-no-longer-a-pain (last
visited Jan. 17, 2015) (discussing advances made in ear-piercing technology that
may allow metal-sensitive individuals to have their ears pierced) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
400. See supra Part IV.B.2 (describing the Bases for Possible Restriction and
Magnitude prong of the proposed test).
401. Schools, however, can impose, for the purpose of controlling gang
activity, dress codes that preclude wearing of body piercings. See, e.g., Long v.
Bd. of Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 629 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (reflecting for reference
the school dress code prohibiting body piercings in a case considering whether
the dress code enforcement was discriminatory). If the gangs were organized as
religious organizations that preyed violently on outsiders, the earring ban might
be acceptable under the Indirect Effects prong. Of note, piercing the ears of
kittens is criminal in Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d.
396, 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (confirming sentence of appellant who used a
14-gauge needle to pierce the ears and scruff of a three-pound kitten, finding
that she acted willfully and maliciously).
402. See infra notes 403–410 and accompanying text (considering infant
ritual circumcision, facial tattooing and scarification, and limiting child
education in the context of the test).
403. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting the opposition of
Swedish and Danish medical associations and their efforts to ban the
procedure).
404. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Efforts to Ban Circumcision Gain Traction in
California, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/06/05/us/05circumcision.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 17, 2016) (reporting that
one group obtained over 7,100 signatures to ban circumcision of minors) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
405. See generally Morten Frisch et al., Male Circumcision and Sexual
Function in Men and Women: A Survey-Based, Cross-Sectional Study in
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would likely allow states to ban it under our test. 406 However,
this claim has not been borne out by randomized and large
case-control trials. 407 To the contrary, these have shown no
adverse effect. 408 Further, serious complications from ritual
circumcision are extremely rare. 409 Finally, under the prevailing
norms in the United States, the third prong of test would also
preclude banning ritual circumcision410 because infant
circumcision is a legal mainstream practice. 411 To prohibit only
religiously motivated infant circumcision would thus violate the
Free Exercise Clause. Consequently, circumcision fails to meet
the criteria required for regulation under our test as causing
objective harm. 412 Of course, if credible scientific evidence of
serious adverse effects of circumcision emerges and if society then
bans all medically elective circumcision practices, and not merely
ritual circumcision, the status of circumcision under our test
would change as well. 413
Next, we previously discussed briefly the practice of
extensive facial tattooing and scarification. 414 Consider a religious
Denmark, 40 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1367 (2011) (studying circumcision and its
effects on sexual function).
406. See infra notes 407–414 and accompanying text (discussing the impacts
of ritual circumcision and analyzing them in reference to the authors’ proposed
test).
407. See Helen A. Weiss et al., Complications of Circumcision in Male
Neonates, Infants and Children: A Systematic Review, 10 BMC UROLOGY 3–5
(2010) (surveying twenty-six studies regarding the outcomes of circumcision
procedures in infants and young children).
408. See id. at 3 (stating that most of the studies surveyed reported no
severe adverse events, indicating no significant loss of sexual function).
409. See id. (noting that three studies of infants found that 1%–2% of boys
experienced a serious complication as a result of circumcision).
410. See supra Part IV.A.3 (acknowledging societal tolerance for certain
activities under the Magnitude prong of the test).
411. See Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male Circumcision to Understand Social
Norms as Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 455, 457 (2003) (discussing why male
circumcision is a social norm).
412. See supra Part IV.A (proposing that the government may restrict a
religious practice if it has high likelihood of significant negative effects as long
as society does not tolerate harms from a similar practice).
413. See supra Part IV.A.3 (recognizing that if the government restricts a
secular practice that is comparable to a religious practice, the analysis for the
third prong of the proposed test changes).
414. See supra Part IV.B.2.c (referencing facial tattooing as an example of a
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culture whose members traditionally cover most of their faces
with tattoos at the onset of puberty. 415 The tattoo designs are
simultaneously both an indicator of status and an expression of
religious devotion. 416 However, a face largely covered with tattoos
likely would be a barrier to employment and to social integration
in the United States. Arguably, then, the practice would trigger
the Direct Effects prong, and the state could try to prevent
underage children from having facial tattoos, even over the
objection of the parents and children. 417 Notably, laws already
prohibit elective tattooing of minors, 418 and so a ban on ritual
tattooing would be consistent with the Magnitude prong. 419
A similar analysis might apply to religious groups that limit
the education of children to an extent that makes it difficult for
them to function economically in society. 420 In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 421 the Supreme Court allowed Amish parents to terminate
their children’s education before the age otherwise mandated by
the state. 422 The Court did not support the Amish categorically,
however. 423 Rather, it balanced the interests of the Amish against
those of the state. 424 While it found that the state requirements
practice that may have an adverse social stigma affecting employability).
415. See generally Palmer & Tano, supra note 340 (describing Maori cultural
tradition of facial tattoos, which provided information about the individual).
416. See id. (discussing the moko, which is connected to religious life of the
Maori and also showed the status of an individual).
417. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (proposing that a state could regulate religious
activities that have a negative direct effect on societal engagement and
integration).
418. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-71 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any
person to tattoo the body of any person under the age of 18 . . . .”); FLA. STAT.
§ 381.00787 (2012) (“A person may not tattoo the body of a minor child younger
than 16 years of age . . . .”).
419. See supra Part IV.A.3 (proposing that a religious practice may only be
restricted where it is not similar to an activity accepted by society).
420. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (comparing the
state’s interest in the importance of education to an individual’s ability to
engage in and contribute to society with the Amish belief in limited education).
421. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
422. See id. at 234–35 (holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prevent the State from compelling residents to cause their children to attend
formal high school to age 16”).
423. See id. at 213–15 (noting the state’s interest in educating its citizens).
424. See id. (weighing the state’s interest in education against the
fundamental Amish interest in directing their children’s education).
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would be highly disruptive to the Amish “community and
religious practice,” 425 it also found that the Amish were
“successful and self-sufficient,” 426 and that the education they
gave their children did “not impair the physical or mental health
of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to
discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any
other way materially detract from the welfare of society.” 427
Today, this analysis is open to renewed question, as the decision
not to formally educate children past the eighth grade may
prevent those who wish to leave Amish society from successfully
integrating into broader society. 428
Importantly, some lower courts have rejected parallel
educational accommodations for other religious groups that did
not have a similar track record of successfully preparing their
children to function economically. 429 Even if the Amish continue
to enjoy the protections of Yoder, legislatures and courts must
carefully consider whether other religious individuals and groups
who refuse to meet state-imposed educational requirements
impose direct costs on the children or indirect costs on society (by
making society responsible for their economic maintenance as
adults) by limiting their education. Thus, private religious
schools that refuse to teach children English or foundational
skills should be subjected to intense legal scrutiny and, perhaps,
outlawed. 430
425. Id. at 218.
426. Id. at 235.
427. Id. at 234.
428. See Gage Raley, Yoder Revisited: Why the Landmark Amish Schooling
Case Could—and Should—Be Overturned, 97 VA. L. REV. 681, 694–95 (2011)
(arguing that Amish children are not prepared to be economically productive if
they leave the Amish community because the skillset necessary for successful
engagement in modern society has changed since the Supreme Court’s decision
in Yoder).
429. See, e.g., Duro v. Dist. Attorney, Second Judicial Dist., 712 F.2d 96, 99
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding that North Carolina’s interest in compulsory education
outweighed the Pentecostalists’ religious interest); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689
F. Supp. 106, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that New York’s minimum standards
of instruction for school-aged children were valid).
430. See, e.g., Jennifer Miller, Yiddish Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/nyregion/a-yeshiva-graduate-fightsfor-secular-studies-in-hasidic-education.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016)
(describing the limited education provided by Jewish private schools in New
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We do not mean to suggest that homeschooling and other
means of privately educating children for religious reasons should
be prohibited because of assumed direct harm to children. 431
Indeed, studies show that homeschooled children are typically
well-prepared for higher education or to obtain jobs as adults. 432
However, we do think that states have an obligation to monitor
and regulate alternative educational arrangements to ensure that
children receive basic education in critical subjects to allow them
to seek a range of employment opportunities as adults. This could
include mandatory testing in some subjects or basic curricular
requirements. 433 Note, though, that if states allow people to
homeschool for both religious and non-religious reasons, the
Magnitude prong of our proposed test would only require that all
groups are subjected to the same requirements for setting
standards for educational progress and for monitoring those
standards. 434

York) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Frimet Goldberger,
When Hasidic Boys Grow up Without Real School, FORWARD (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://forward.com/sisterhood/194267/when-hasidic-boys-grow-up-without-realschool/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (discussing the effects of Hasidic schools in
Canada, where students learn only rudimentary English) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
431. See Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the
First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 313–14 (2000)
(discussing when the state should intervene in parents’ educational decisions).
432. See Lynn O’Shaughnessy, Can Homeschoolers Do Well in College?, CBS
NEWS (July 20, 2010, 7:09 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/canhomeschoolers-do-well-in-college/ (last updated July 22, 2010) (last visited Jan.
18, 2016) (discussing new research showing the success of homeschooling) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
433. States currently impose a range of different requirements on
homeschoolers, from virtually none at all to extensive testing. See McMullen,
supra note 8, at 87 (describing the three categories of homeschooling laws in
effect in various states). It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider all
possible approaches, but we believe that states that impose no requirements are
derelict in their obligations. On the other hand, some states may impose too
many requirements if they require educational achievement beyond that which
would be sufficient to prepare adequately children for a range of careers, or if
they require testing beyond that which is required in public schools.
434. See supra Part IV.A.3 (proposing a test prong that compares religious
practices with mainstream acceptance of a practice with a similar magnitude of
harm).
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2. Cases Involving Potential Harm to Third Parties
Now consider mandatory childhood vaccination laws. Every
state requires children to be vaccinated against deadly diseases
to attend school. 435 When the federal government enacted the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 436 and adopted
related regulations, it conditioned federal funding for states upon
their inclusion of religious exceptions to mandatory vaccination
laws.437 Although the Act’s religious exception mandate was later
repealed, 438 the vast majority of states had by then adopted such
exceptions. 439 Fully forty-seven states now accommodate religious
and other conscientious objectors by allowing them to opt out of
childhood vaccination schedules. 440 These carve-outs for religious
objections to vaccination laws aptly illustrate the interest group
dynamic that sometimes privileges and protects even disfavored
religious practices.441 The majority of people support mandatory
vaccination laws and oppose such exemptions. 442 Yet those who
435. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 433.267 (2015) (requiring that children shall
provide records of their vaccinations “[a]s a condition of attendance in any
school or childrens facility” in the state).
436. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5119c (2012).
437. See Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Around: Restructuring
Non-Medical Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health
Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 282 (2003) (noting the effect of the federal
act on the enactment of “state laws offering medical exemptions based on
religious grounds occurred”).
438. Id.
439. Id. Only seventeen states appear to extend these exemptions to
non-religious objectors. Id. at 284. Note that California has recently become the
third state to eliminate all exemptions, except where there are medical reasons
that a child cannot be vaccinated. See Michael Martinez & Amanda Watts,
California Governor signs vaccine bill that bans personal, religious exemptions,
CNN (June 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/health/california-vaccinebill/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (discussing California’s Senate Bill 277) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
440. Silverman, supra note 437, at 282.
441. See supra Part III.B (outlining the relationship between public
accommodations and interest group advocacy and suggesting that religious
groups function as interest groups).
442. See Alistair Bell, Big U.S. Majority Favors Mandatory Vaccinations,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2015/02/24/poll-big-us-majority-fa_n_6742162.html (last updated Apr.
26, 2015) (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (stating that 78% of the people surveyed
said children should be vaccinated unless they have a health risk) (on file with
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support the exemptions are passionate and active proponents of
practices they consider vital, whereas opponents are dispersed and
disorganized because the issue is of low priority for them. 443
Consequently, politicians have been responsive to the minority.444
The practice of withholding vaccinations against serious
illnesses could be analyzed under the Direct Effects basis because
it carries risks for the unvaccinated children of the religious
group. 445 However, it also falls under the Indirect Effects basis
because it also imposes risks on outsiders. 446 Children who cannot
be vaccinated because of compromised immune systems or due to
allergies to ingredients in vaccines, and others for whom
vaccination fails, rely on high vaccination rates. 447 Indeed, there
have been recent deadly outbreaks of preventable diseases, and
outsiders as well as the children of those engaged in the religious
practice have suffered as a result. 448 Under our test, states may—
indeed, perhaps must—eliminate such exemptions. 449 The risks of
non-vaccination are likely in certain communities and grave for
both children within the group and the vulnerable outside the
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
443. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (discussing how a
minority advocate for a measure may be more successful when there is a weak
majority opposition).
444. See Silverman, supra note 437, at 282 (noting the almost universal
adoption of state law religious exemptions from school immunization
requirements). This dynamic is not preordained, however. In the wake of deadly
outbreaks of preventable childhood diseases, the broader public sometimes
becomes focused on the issue sufficiently to provoke changes in the law to limit
or eliminate such exemptions. This recently occurred in California. See Martinez
& Watts, supra note 439 (providing coverage for California’s passage of a bill
removing all exemptions for vaccinations except where children have a health
reason).
445. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (proposing that a practice should be regulated
if it subjects vulnerable populations, such as children, to severe risk of harm or
death).
446. See supra Part IV.A.1.b (proposing that a practice should be regulated
if it places a severe burden on society).
447. See Silverman, supra note 437, at 278–79 (discussing the benefits of
mandatory childhood vaccinations).
448. See Sifferlin, supra note 157 (describing the recent cases of measles in
New York City); Doucleff, supra note 157 (discussing the outbreaks of whooping
cough).
449. See supra Part IV.A (proposing that religious practices may be
regulated when their direct or indirect effects are severe as long as there is no
comparable secular practice accepted by society).
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group (satisfying the Likelihood prong). 450 Many states also
provide for directly observed therapy for tuberculosis medications
or quarantine for health professionals exposed to Ebola
(satisfying the Magnitude prong). 451 Consequently, legislatures
should act to change their vaccination laws. Failing that, courts
should perhaps strike down vaccine exemptions under the
Establishment Clause.
The test also applies to the question of whether and how to
accommodate medical practitioners whose religious beliefs
prohibit them from providing certain medical services. 452 In some
cases, allowing these medical practitioners to decline to provide
certain medical services can harm individuals seeking those
services. 453 Several federal statutes allow health care
professionals and institutions with religious objections to refuse
to provide care related to abortion and sterilization procedures. 454
450. See Silverman, supra note 437, at 278–79 (outlining the significant
societal benefits of vaccines). We think that parallel exemptions for
conscientious objectors are reasonably considered religious in nature, but we
recognize that some may disagree and argue that these are better understood as
comparable mainstream practices. If so, then a state that offers such exemptions
must also offer religious vaccination exemptions, but a state may not offer only
religious exemptions. In any event, we believe that the risks associated with
non-vaccination are so severe for certain childhood diseases that only
well-documented medical exceptions should be granted.
451. See generally Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2029 (2014); Self-Study Modules on Tuberculosis, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/tb/education/
ssmodules/module9/ss9reading2.htm (last updated Sept. 1, 2012) (last visited
Jan. 18, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
452. See infra notes 453–464 and accompanying text (discussing the
application of the proposed test in the context of contraception).
453. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and
the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 78
(1995) (“Despite forceful and increasingly frequent arguments that the harm
caused by restrictive abortion laws deny equal protection, at least as much as
they impinge on personal privacy, the Court has steadfastly refused to consider
abortion in this light.”).
454. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2012) (prohibiting discrimination by government
licensing entities of an entity that refuses to participate in or offer trainings in
the performance of induced abortions); id. § 300a-7 (addressing the exceptions
for sterilization and abortion); 45 C.F.R. § 88.1 (2015) (stating that the purpose
of the section is “to provide for the enforcement” of several acts “referred to
collectively as the ‘federal health care provider conscience protection statutes’”);
Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause:
The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral
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States have overwhelmingly followed the lead of the federal
government and in some respects have gone much further. 455
According to the Guttmacher Institute, forty-five states allow
individual health care providers to refuse to provide abortion
services normally provided by identical professionals. 456 Of these,
forty-three allow even government-owned health care institutions
to refuse to provide such services, while thirteen give the
dispensation only to private institutions. 457 Moreover, eighteen
states allow providers to refuse to provide sterilization services;
ten allow providers to refuse to provide services related to
contraception; between six and twelve permit pharmacists to
refuse to dispense contraceptives; and nine allow health care
institutions to refuse to provide contraceptive services. 458 This
does not tell the whole story, as participation is not necessarily
explicitly required in other states, and we are unaware of
situations in which government has sanctioned health care
professionals for refusing to provide services in the area of
reproductive control.
Under the proposed test, whether such accommodations are
advisable, or even permissible, is highly fact-dependent. 459 The
nature of the service being sought matters a great deal, as does
the relative ease with which the person seeking the service may
obtain them elsewhere. 460 Both factors go to the nature of the
burdens that the religious practitioner imposes on others. 461 If a
proposed law allows a pharmacist to decline to fill a prescription
for contraception, but only where another employee in the
Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 781 (2007) (discussing the trend of legislation
that allows physicians to refuse treatment options).
455. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE
HEALTH SERVICES (2016).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. See supra Part IV.A (outlining the proposed test as an analysis of
various factors which are heavily reliant on the specific context of the religious
practice in question).
460. See supra Part IV.A (proposing the test’s prongs that consider the
direct effects of the religious practice on individuals and the burden or likelihood
of those effects).
461. See supra Part IV.A.2 (describing the Likelihood prong of the proposed
test).
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pharmacy is available and willing to do so, then the medical and
economic costs are almost altogether mitigated and the religious
practice must be tolerated. 462 If, on the other hand, a proposed
law provides an absolute right for every pharmacist to decline to
fill the prescription and there is no other pharmacy in close
proximity, then the harms and costs may be substantial enough
to prohibit the religious practice. 463 A proposed law that allows a
pharmacist to decline to provide the medication, but only if she
will transfer the prescription to a vendor within a radius of five
miles who is available and willing to fill it, presents a middle
case. 464 We encourage policymakers and judges to apply our test
in this fact-specific manner using accepted medical criteria for
harm (such as considering unwanted pregnancy to be a harm) to
resolve such questions.
V. The Test’s Implications and Limitations
Our test for resolving these conflicts has potential
implications for a wide range of clashes between law and religion,
but it also has some important limitations. 465 We identify and
address these in this Part.
A. The Test Primarily Applies Only to a Limited Category of
Cases, but It May Have Important Implications for Many Others
As currently conceived, the test is intended to apply
primarily to cases in which the risks and harms associated with a
462. See, e.g., 49 PA. CODE § 27.103 (2015) (declaring that a pharmacy should
reasonably accommodate the pharmacist’s beliefs while assuring the delivery of
services that the patients need).
463. On the other hand, compelling professionals to perform acts that they
conscientiously object to might cause them to leave localities where such
professionals are scarce, further compounding problems of access to care. It may
also dissuade people from entering those specialties. Even if a government
action is permissible under our test, it is not necessarily wise.
464. See, e.g., 49 PA. CODE § 27.103 (creating obligations for pharmacists
who refuse to fill prescriptions based on religious beliefs).
465. See infra Parts V.A–C (discussing the application of the proposed text
to a limited category of cases, its constraints on prohibiting religious practices
altogether, and its inability to resolve certain cases).
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religious practice are primarily health or medically related,
though economic and education-related applications also may
come into play. 466 In contrast to other kinds of harms, these
harms are relatively concrete and often quantifiable, and
therefore reasonably susceptible to the kind of balancing and
comparisons the test demands. 467 The test does not necessarily
apply in the same way to a variety of other kinds of cases
involving conflicts of rights in which such quantifiable risks and
harms are not implicated. 468
For instance, one of the highest profile and most politically
charged contemporary law and religion debates concerns whether
there should be religious accommodations for laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 469 Such
accommodations plainly impose costs and harms on third parties,
and anti-discrimination laws typically do not include comparable
exceptions for mainstream practices. 470 However, the primary
harms in such cases are not usually of the sort contemplated by
the test; rather, they are dignitary harms. 471 We do not mean to
suggest that such harms are not “real.” Indeed, dignitary harms
of the sort imposed by a real or proverbial “no gays allowed” sign
on a business are in some senses among the most painful. 472 But
466. See supra Part IV.C (examining the application of the proposed test in
the contexts of ear piercing, facial tattooing, circumcision, contraception, and
education).
467. See supra Parts IV.A–C (outlining the prongs of the proposed test, the
analysis associated with each prong, and the application of the test to several
more concrete religious practices, such as ear piercing and circumcision).
468. See infra notes 469–473 and accompanying text (introducing and
discussing religious accommodations for sexual orientation discrimination as an
example of a category of cases that the test is not equipped to address).
469. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom? Gay Rights
Versus Religious Freedom, 95 KY. L.J. 553 (2007) (discussing the debate about
whether religious groups can discriminate based on sexual orientation).
470. See
Andrew
Koppelman,
You
Can’t
Hurry
Love:
Why
Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious
Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 131–37 (2006) (discussing the effects of
religious exemptions from antidiscrimination protection of gay people).
471. See Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships,
Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1228 (2012) (discussing the extent of the harm to one’s
dignity that results from discrimination).
472. See Melissa Chan, Tennessee Hardware Store Owner Posts ‘No Gays
Allowed’ Sign on Front Door: ‘I’ll Never Regret This,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 1,
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they are not quantifiable. 473 Thus, while we do not discount the
possibility that the test could play a guiding role in deciding such
cases, the matter requires further consideration.
Of course, in some cases the harms of such religious
accommodations are indeed economic, such as in geographic
areas where gay and lesbian individuals may not easily be able to
obtain services from alternative, non-objecting service
providers. 474 In such cases, the test should certainly guide the
decision whether and how to accommodate religious objectors. 475
For an example of how policies could be crafted in such cases,
some states provide that pharmacists with religious objections to
dispensing certain medications may decline to do so, but only if
someone else in the same pharmacy is prepared to do so. 476
Similarly, in the same-sex marriage context, Utah recently
enacted an intriguing compromise that exempts government
officials with religious objections to same-sex marriage from
providing marriage licenses but provides that someone must be
available who is willing to do so. 477 These kinds of compromises
are reasonable attempts to balance the values of pluralism and
religious freedom against those of monism and the protection of
the interests of third parties in a manner compatible with the
mandates of the religion clauses. 478
2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/tennessee-hardware-storeowner-posts-no-gays-allowed-sign-article-1.2277673 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016)
(discussing a business owner that put a “No Gays Allowed” sign on the front
door) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
473. See Nejaime, supra note 471, at 1228 (considering the distinction
between a status-based harm and insulted dignity as examples of outcomes from
discriminatory behavior).
474. See, e.g., infra notes 476–477 and accompanying text (discussing
Pennsylvania and Utah as examples of states where it may be more difficult to
get access to contraceptives or marriage licenses).
475. See supra Parts IV.A–B (providing a framework for applying the
proposed test where the religious practice is concrete and leads to concrete
harms).
476. See, e.g., 49 PA. CODE § 27.103 (2015) (creating obligations for
pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions based on religious beliefs).
477. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-20-201 (LexisNexis 2015) (prohibiting a
state official from requiring a religious official to solemnize a marriage contrary
to the religious official’s beliefs); id. § 17-20-4 (enumerating the duties of a
county clerk).
478. See supra Part III (exploring the considerations involved in
determining whether or not to accommodate religiously motivated exceptions to
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B. The Test Does Not Always Mandate the Prohibition of Religious
Practices, Even Where Its Conditions Are Met
One implication of the test is that at least some religious
practices that meet the criteria of the first prong should not be
tolerated by society, so long as the limitations in the Likelihood
and Magnitude prongs are not implicated. 479 This comports both
with a just society’s interest in and obligation to protect citizens
from harms imposed by others and with the Establishment
Clause concern of giving special legal license for religious groups
to harm others. 480 However, we do not mean to imply that society
must necessarily ban all such practices. There are at least two
circumstances in which legal prohibition is not necessarily
warranted and where, ultimately, policymakers’ judgments ought
to be respected. 481
First, reasonable people may disagree as to what kinds of
harms meet the criteria under the Bases for Possible Restriction
to make prohibition of the associated religious practice
appropriate. 482 In using terms like “unreasonable burdens,”
“sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,” and
“objectively severe” in the first prong, we recognize that these
terms necessitate judgment. 483 Some policymakers and societies
may tolerate more externalization of risks and costs than others,
and therefore may come to different conclusions as to whether the
potential harms associated with a given religious practice are
intolerable for that society. To be clear, if the society prohibits
comparable mainstream practices, then the Establishment

laws).
479. See supra Part IV (describing the proposed test and providing examples
of religious practices that satisfy its parameters).
480. See supra Part III (discussing the development of accommodations
through political advocacy for certain activities recognized by society as
harmful).
481. See infra notes 482–489 and accompanying text (noting circumstances
where there is disagreement about the extent of the harms resulting from a
practice or where banning a practice may actually create more significant
problems).
482. See supra Parts IV.A–B (discussing the considerations for applying the
Bases for Possible Restriction to various religious practices).
483. Supra Part IV.A.1.
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Clause may require it to prohibit the religious practice as well. 484
However, where there is no comparable mainstream practice, it
might better be left to policymakers rather than courts—except
perhaps in the most extreme cases—to decide whether the
religious practice is tolerable. 485
Second, even where a religious practice is clearly intolerable
under the test, it is not necessarily the case that the best or
necessary course is for society to prohibit the practice as a legal
Sometimes
banning
a
practice
can
be
matter. 486
counterproductive and ineffective in achieving the desired result,
whereas an alternative approach—such as through educational
initiatives, attempts to persuade, or other “nudges”—may be
more productive. 487 This is true, of course, for non-religious
practices as well; most American jurisdictions do not ban alcohol
use despite the potential deleterious effects of drinking. 488 Again,
these are typically decisions to be left to policymakers. 489
C. The Test Does Not Resolve All Cases in Which It Applies
Perhaps the most important limitation of the test is that,
even where it is implicated, that is, where religious practices
potentially impose health or economic harms, it will not provide a
clear resolution to every church-state conflict. 490 In the most basic
484. See supra Parts III.A–B (providing background for situations when
religious practices do not receive accommodations).
485. See infra Part V.C (discussing the role of policymakers in circumstances
when the proposed test does not achieve the desired result).
486. See infra notes 487–489 and accompanying text (considering the
potential negative effects of banning or regulating a particular practice).
487. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So
Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 353, 437 (2004) (explaining how punishing vaccination resistors was
ineffective and why it is necessary to educate parents regarding the risks of
diseases compared to vaccines).
488. See Data and Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/data-stats.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2015) (last
visited Jan. 20, 2016) (reflecting state-by-state binge drinking and listing some
of the dangers associated with excessive drinking) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
489. See infra Part V.C (discussing the role of policymakers in the context of
the separation of church and state).
490. See infra notes 491–494 and accompanying text (discussing the
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sense, the test cannot resolve all cases for the same reason that
other legal tests cannot: reasonable people will reasonably
disagree. With respect to our test, reasonable people may
reasonably disagree about the magnitude of the risks associated
with a particular religious practice. 491 Some policymakers will
consider certain costs tolerable, while others will find the same
costs intolerable. 492 Consequently, they may disagree as to how to
treat the religious practice under the first prong of the test. 493 As
already noted, terms in the first prong like “unreasonable
burdens,” “sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,”
and “objectively severe” require the application of judgment, and
people’s judgment may differ in different cases. 494 But this lack of
certitude is not something that should concern us any more than
it does in the case of any other legal test. In many cases, the
correct result is clear, which is a sufficient benefit in itself. 495 And
in those cases where the correct result is reasonably subject to
dispute, the test still represents an improvement over the current
ad hoc and unprincipled approach if it succeeds in orienting
policy debates towards a principled discussion concerning the
nature, magnitude, and tolerability of the costs imposed by the
religious practice in question.
The Magnitude prong of the test presents a different set of
difficulties. 496 This prong asks policymakers, and especially
challenges presented by the uncertain nature of the proposed test’s
interpretation by different decision-makers in different contexts).
491. See infra notes 492–494 and accompanying text (addressing the
qualitative nature of the assessment in the first prong of the proposed test and
its susceptibility to varying applications).
492. See, e.g., supra Part IV.C (providing examples of religious practices that
have yielded contrasting responses from policymakers, such as childhood
education).
493. See supra Part III.A (outlining the parameters of the direct and indirect
effect analysis under the first prong of the test, which requires decision-makers
to assess the harms associated with a particular religious practice).
494. See supra Part IV.A.1 (providing a discussion of the proposed test’s
specific factors).
495. See supra Part IV.C (applying the proposed test to several religious
practices, such as circumcision and facial tattooing, and finding that the test
achieves a correct result in these concrete cases).
496. See infra notes 497–499 and accompanying text (noting that the third
prong of the proposed test is not relevant where a unique religious practice does
not have a mainstream counterpart).
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judges, to examine challenged religious practices in the context of
comparable mainstream practices and to treat them similarly. 497
But not every religious practice has a comparable mainstream
practice. 498 Some practices may be unique to certain religious
groups and not replicated by others. 499 Consider some
ultra-Orthodox500 Jews’s practice of metzitzah b’peh 501 during the
infant circumcision ritual, in which the mohel briefly applies
direct oral suction to the circumcision wound. 502 In rare cases,
where the mohel carries the herpes simplex virus, this practice
can transmit the virus to the child, which can be fatal. 503 In
considering whether to tolerate or prohibit this religious
practice—or to undertake other means to reduce its prevalence
497. See supra Part IV.A.3 (proposing that a religious practice not be
restricted if a comparative and commonly practiced secular activity exists).
498. See, e.g., James Pellerin & Michael B. Edmond, Infections Associated
with Religious Rituals, 17 INT'L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASE e945, e945 (2013)
(exploring the potential infections resulting from the Hindu side roll, where
devotees lay on their sides and roll along the same path as the icons of various
deities, contracting skin infections as a result of canine fecal material along the
same path).
499. See infra notes 500–503 and accompanying text (introducing and
discussing the distinctive religious practice metzitzah b’peh).
500. We use the term “ultra-Orthodox” as a term that many of our readers
will recognize as a descriptor of those Jews whose especially extensive rules of
conduct creates physical and psychological separation not only from non-Jews,
but from Jews whose observance is more lenient. Those to whom the term is
applied do not use it themselves, and this term may be unfair both to them and
to Orthodox Jews. Rather, they call themselves Charedim (singular, Charedi), a
term we eschew because many readers would not recognize it. See Jodi Rudoren,
Israel Prods Ultra-Orthodox to ‘Share Burden,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/world/middleeast/israels-ultra-orthodoxfight-to-fit-in.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (describing ultra-Orthodox Jews
in Israel using the term “Haredim,” reflecting the variable spellings of Hebrew
terms translated to English) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
501. See Pellerin & Edmond, supra note 498, at e946–e947 (reviewing the
existing medical literature for specific religious practices associated with
infection, such as metzitzah b’peh and the shared chalice of Christian
communion). An alternative spelling is “metzitzah be’peh”; the term means
“suction by mouth” in Hebrew. See Jamie Cole Kerlee, Too Much Religious
Freedom? Infants Infected with Herpes After Jewish Mohel Applies Oral Suction
to Circumcised Penises, 19 J.L. & HEALTH 297, 300 (2005) (using the spelling
“metzitzah be’peh” to refer the practice).
502. Pellerin & Edmond, supra note 498, at e945–e946.
503. See id. (noting the documented cases linking outbreaks of herpes in
male infants shortly after undergoing the metzitzah ritual).
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and the risks it imposes—the Magnitude prong of the test invites
policymakers to consider how the law treats analogous
mainstream conduct. 504 Yet we are unaware of any comparable
non-religious practice of placing one’s mouth in brief contact with
a child’s penis. 505 The law simply has no provision for such a
practice—except, of course, where the contact is sexual in nature,
which is not an analogous practice 506—because the practice is
unknown to the law outside of this minority religious practice. 507
In such cases, how should policymakers and judges apply the
test?
There are at least three different possible approaches to this
sort of problem. 508 The first is to look for the closest mainstream
practices to compare the religious practice to. 509 For example, in
addressing the practice of metzitzah b’peh, a policymaker or judge
could consider how the law treats other practices that may lead to
the transmission of the herpes virus to infants. 510 Research shows
that breastfeeding an infant is a far greater cause of herpes than
is metzitzah b’peh, 511 but the law does nothing to dissuade, let
504. See supra Part IV.A.3 (suggesting that, under the third prong of the
proposed test, where a religious practice has a comparable mainstream practice,
policymakers should not restrict the religious practice).
505. This is not analogous to sexual crimes because the statutes in those
cases require that the intent of the act must be sexual.
506. If it were analogous, the sexual abuse laws would not explicitly require
sexual intent.
507. See supra notes 505–506 and accompanying text (discussing the
absence of any comparable secular practice or any law regulating this specific
religious practice).
508. See infra notes 509–528 and accompanying text (suggesting that
policymakers look to the closest practice and that courts apply strict scrutiny, or
that decision-makers apply the test according to their roles, the case, and the
most relevant test prongs).
509. See infra notes 510–512 and accompanying text (introducing a
comparison between metzitzah b’peh and breastfeeding and considering the two
against the proposed test).
510. See infra note 512 and accompanying text (demonstrating that
government is supportive of breastfeeding without distinguishing mothers who
may have the herpes simplex virus).
511. See, e.g., Mary Boyd, Herpes: From Mom to Baby—and Back Again, Via
Breastfeeding, CONSULTANT FOR PEDIATRICIANS (2009), http://www.pediatrics
consultant360.com/content/herpes-mom-baby%E2%80%94and-back-again-breast
-feeding (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (noting that reported incidents of herpes
transmission due to breastfeeding are extremely rare) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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alone prohibit, carriers of the virus from breastfeeding their
children. 512 From this, some may conclude that the law is
apparently indifferent to or tolerant of practices that impose far
greater risks of herpes transmission, and consequently, that it
must also tolerate metzitzah b’peh.
We are highly skeptical of this approach, because the
comparison between the two practices (breastfeeding and
metzitzah b’peh) is inapt. Breastfeeding, unlike the metzitzah
b’peh practice, potentially carries with it substantial quantifiable
health and economic benefits that may outweigh the similarly
quantifiable health risks. 513 Further, even if it were in theory
sensible to regulate breastfeeding, it would be impossible to do so
given the nature of the mother-child relationship in which
breastfeeding takes place. 514 It is simply impractical for the law
to require mothers to be tested for herpes before being “licensed”
to breastfeed their children. 515 In contrast, because mohels are
trained professionals who offer their services for payment, the
law could require them to be regularly tested for the herpes
disease or require informed consent of the nature of the risk on
the part of the parents before the circumcision takes place. 516 In
short, where there is no directly analogous mainstream practice
to the religious practice, we caution against using only
marginally similar mainstream practices as a primary reference
512. See, e.g., A Look at Enacting Breastfeeding Legislation, LA LECHE
LEAGUE INT’L, http://www.llli.org/law/lawenact.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2016)
(reviewing existing government promotion and regulation breastfeeding) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
513. See Olha Lutsiv et al., Women’s Intentions to Breastfeed: A
Population-Based Cohort Study, 120 INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1490,
1490 (2013) (describing the benefits of breastfeeding).
514. Cf. Monique Anikwue, Breast Still Best: An Argument in Favor of One
HIV Positive Mother’s Right to Breastfeed, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 479,
480 (2003) (pointing out the close bonds formed between mothers and their
breastfeeding infants and raising the issue of the criminalization of
breastfeeding for HIV positive mothers).
515. See Genital Herpes—CDC Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/std/herpes/stdfact-herpes.htm (last visited Jan.
20, 2016) (providing facts about herpes, which is caused by the viruses herpes
simplex type 1 and type 2) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
“About one out of every six people aged 14 to 49 years have genital herpes.” Id.
516. See generally Kerlee, supra note 501 (explaining the ritual of metzitzah
b’peh, including discussions about requiring HSV testing and parental consent).
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point. There are likely to be so many confounding variables that
the comparison would be one of apples-to-computers rather than
apples-to-apples and tend to confuse more than it illuminates. 517
A second possibility is to adopt the approach of the Second
Circuit and to apply strict scrutiny to any regulation that targets
unique religious practices that have no mainstream analog. 518
That is, any regulation that targets only religious practices—even
where the targeting is due to the sui generis nature of the
practice—must have a compelling justification, be narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired end, and be no more restrictive
than necessary. 519 We believe that this is certainly the correct
approach for non-judicial policymakers to adopt, and that this is
reflected in how the Bases for Possible Restriction prong and
Likelihood prongs of the test work together. 520 That is, any
practice that meets the exacting requirements of these two
prongs and thus justifies restriction is almost certain to also pass
strict scrutiny. 521 Consequently, where the Magnitude prong
cannot be considered due to the simple absence of any comparable
mainstream practices, decision makers have no choice but to
consider the Bases for Possible Restriction prong and Likelihood
517. See, e.g., supra notes 513–516 and accompanying text (comparing
metzitzah b’peh with breastfeeding and drawing distinctions in terms of
regulation).
518. Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the U.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 2014) (considering whether a requirement to
obtain written consent before performing metzitzah b’peh violates the First
Amendment and concluding that the regulation must satisfy strict scrutiny
because it was neither neutral nor generally applicable).
519. Id.; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is
never permissible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance
that interest.” (citations omitted)); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify an inroad on religious
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest.”).
520. See supra Part IV.B (describing the relationship between the effects of
a religious practice and the likelihood of those effects).
521. See supra Part IV.A.1 (using terms like “unreasonable burdens,”
“sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,” and “objectively severe” to
establish the high standard of the Bases for Possible Restriction and Likelihood
prongs).
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prongs in isolation. 522 This probably corresponds to a legislative
version of strict scrutiny.
For institutional reasons, however, we are uncertain whether
this is the proper approach for courts to adopt. The Magnitude
prong naturally lends itself to judicial inquiry because it plays to
the institutional strengths of the judiciary—analogizing between
cases to ensure equal treatment; 523 whereas the Bases for
Possible Restriction and the Likelihood prong, which require
decision makers to make fact-based policy determinations and
analyses of risk, is more appropriate for legislators and
administrative officials. 524 Simply put, judges may not be
equipped to engage in such factual inquiries. 525 Perhaps, then,
judges should defer to legislative and administrative judgments
in such cases, absent actual evidence of animus (if the practice is
prohibited by statute or regulation), 526 compelling evidence that
the practice imposes unusually large costs on children or third
parties (if the practice is permitted), 527 or some other reason to
suspect that the decision-making process was tainted. 528
Thus, it could be that the test requires that
differently-situated decision makers apply it differently.
Alternatively, perhaps judicial scrutiny should be the norm to
police the line between Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
522.
523.

Supra Part IV.A.
See Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 835, 838 (2012) (discussing judicial reliance on precedents
and treating like cases alike).
524. See supra Part IV.B.1 (noting that policymakers should enforce the first
and second prongs of the proposed test).
525. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1669–70
(explaining the “preference for policymaking through political engagement
rather than through judicial fiat,” especially because “judges do a poor job of
protecting unpopular religions”).
526. See, e.g., id. at 1665 (discussing an ordinance that was “rife with
evidence of animus towards practitioners of Santería” (citing Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–35 (1993))).
527. See supra Parts IV.C.1–2 (discussing the application of the test to these
populations).
528. See Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities, supra note 1, at 1683 (“In
the absence of institutional advantages or evidence that the political system is
systematically incapable of taking religious claims of conscience seriously,
courts should generally defer to those policy decisions, whether or not they are
sound.”).
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interests at stake. We do not have a firm view of which approach
is optimal in these difficult cases and suggest that further
consideration is warranted.
VI. Conclusion
There are certain goals for which it is worth unleashing the
potential violence of the state—certain evils that the state should
right—even at the risk of a mutually damaging confrontation
between the state and component minority religious groups. But
for both idealistic and pragmatic reasons, liberal states should
temper their coercive instincts in many cases and adopt an
accommodationist attitude. In the contemporary United States,
there is already a marked tendency toward accommodationism,
but it is inconsistently reflected in the law and, worse, often lacks
principled application. 529 Too often, the decision of whether to
accommodate or prohibit a particular religious practice is driven
by interest group politics rather than by thoughtful policymaking.
Our test is a step forward in that it offers a consistent and
principled approach to these questions that does not simply leave
them to the interest group dynamics of the political marketplace.
Instead, the test balances the needs of the state and those of
religious people by simultaneously acknowledging the state’s
need to protect itself and its citizens from religious practices that
impose costs on others, while also respecting the values of
pluralism. It also incorporates and respects constitutional
church-state doctrines and suggests a way to resolve abiding
tensions between the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses.
Finally, the test can serve as a valuable tool for different kinds of
decision makers—legislators, administrative officials, judges, and
clinicians—and is sensitive to the relative institutional strengths
and weaknesses of each.

529. See supra Part II (considering the inconsistent accommodation
practices of government and judicial entities).

